The Mythology of Imagining

Imagination is an operational mental ability. We know that mental functions rely on other deeper factors, mainly an intact biological organization. But imagination isn’t like hunger; it is like breathing.

In practice, the ability to imagine has no essential requirement other than to pretend -- to pretend that something IS, CAN BE, DOES or CAN DO. 

It carries no requirement for proving feasibility or plausibility. And outside of some need to influence a relationship between separate people, there is no required credibility that needs to be communicated.

What this boils down to is that, beyond biology, it is very difficult to identify what could prevent imagination other than ignorance or a complete lack of motivation.

Conversely, it makes sense that in a given context, knowledge and incentive would be preconditioning success factors for imagining – particularly significant in imagining for desirably influential purposes.,

We attribute value to imagination when it creates an awareness of a possibility, condition, or presence that isn’t currently or expected to be “actual”. But that means the essential usefulness of the term “imagination” is due to it referring to something that is recognized. Recognition is part of deciding what to include in the exercise of pretending, and also part of deciding what to accept among any effects of pretending.

Having said “actual”, it’s worth also checking off “virtual” in the discussion. Going to its Greek roots, virtual refers to characteristics (virtues) that “enable [something]  to perform excellently its proper function.” This relates to  the idea of “essentials” – the defining characteristics of any type of something to identify something meaningfully in type, we need to know certain things about it but not necessarily everything.

As a matter of perception, we pick up on enough evidence of characteristics to conclude that we know what it is we are perceiving ,and furthermore whether it is present in a physical, not just mental, way. But in its mental presence, a form of a recognized thing is a concept, and a concept can be more than enough to cause us to take action. Equally important is that a concept does not need to be typed. It only needs to be remembered, such that it can be reusable in future pretense.

Imagination is conceptual experimentation. The knowledge aspect is important in two ways. One, the most interesting thing about imagination aside from its entertainment value to the imaginer, is that it can originate and present ideas that may have relevance to other people because of what is already real to them. And two, there is relevance to other things, derived from what is already learned. Different kinds of knowledge bring different ideas for consideration in relation to what is already deemed  interesting to dwell on.

But the real distinction of its value starts with the fact that the thing recognized is not “actually” present. It is imaginary. For example, a spill on a floor can be perceived as a spill with no concern for what it might suggest otherwise. Under examination, however, its initial presence may begin to be cognitively reconsidered  – familiarities, contradictions, or other comparisons suggested by things already known or present. Recall, associations, and juxtapositions are extremely common elements of actively imagining.

Here are two imaginary constructs that we can call “bikers”. The stain is compared to a memory of something known, and key characteristics are portably applied to something else to create a new instance of recognition. The fish on a bicycle is irrational as an actual probability but conceptually we know that a bike must be externally powered and that living things supply power, so the association is meaningful “logically” even though not “rationally”.

In another example, each of these two things shown below can be either a “chair” or a “table”. With each of them, the identification in “recognition” is driven by the conditions of the circumstance in which the item is considered. Imagination connects perceived characteristics of what is present with characteristics of something else known that may not even be actually there. In other words, there is a co-incidence – a concurrent incident of more than one thing.

Such a coincidence can be a precondition of imagining, but it may also be an effect of imagining.

Preconditions are not causes; and effects are not necessarily intentional.

Emergence is a useful way to refer to one way that imagination can be catalyzed, but it is not the only way. Composition is a powerful and intentional demonstration of imagination.

The idea that imagination is inherently emergent is not always a true case. It is not the general case. It is a special case. In practice, imagination must not be quarantined by a hyperbole of a particular kind being taken as the only kind. In the same way, productive environmental coincidences must not be taken as a definition of “imagination”.  As an idea, imagination refers to something mental, and claiming that anything other than a living being has a mentality is simply taking some dynamics of the non-living physical world as a metaphor.