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February 27, 2006

Getting Governed: Handling the Risk of Value

Remember life before governance?

We planned the work, and then we worked the plan.
A lot of the planning was about defining the "we" -- and cascading that definition down from the high (market) level to the low (task) level.

In this cascading, our business starts out as a model for certain kinds of market interactions, and then an organization is created to operate according to the model. We have a strong idea about what kinds of things are required for the interactions to succeed, so what we focus on is making sure that we know someone is responsible for attending to those requirements. We distribute those responsibilities -- expecting the organization's dynamics to more or less derive from that distribution.

So far so good. Then the fun begins: people actually start doing things, and on any given day the cause-effect relationships of what they do to what they accomplish is most of what we ever think about -- except of course for considering the value of what got made.

Between the resulting shortcomings and the advantages, the unnecessary and the useful, we make most of our judgement calls about what should continue "as is" and what should change.

The big hypothesis is that the model we started out with will generate sufficient redeemable value, if only it is executed vigorously enough. We're experienced enough to recognize that there will be obstacles, but to get around them or through them, we're willing to redesign the way we meet the requirements.

How much of that flexibility is a good thing?

I.

Most businesses initially take a pragmatic approach to flexibility that looks at whether results seem to be proving the prevailing method of satisfaction. The habit: do more of what works, less of what doesn't, and look mainly for external indicators that something different should be done.

The "performance" mentality is driven by pragmatism. But what has also developed during the last five to ten years is a perspective that holds the entire enterprise responsible to a community of stakeholders -- which expands the range of external drivers and, correspondingly, requirements.

In some arenas, this new perspective argues that the broadened scope of responsibilities actually increases the likelihood not of episodic performance but of sustained performance. The intuitive logic of this is as follows: as an aspect of competition in a hypercompetitive world, it's too risky to alienate or disrepect any stakeholder of significant influence -- namely, one who has the freedom to take their support to a different business (such as customers), or one who has a critical opportunity to undersupport their host (such as sponsors and employees). Performance is therefore seen as the result of stakeholders being motivated to beneficially cooperate in their provision of a hospitable environment for the business's competitiveness.

Environment? As represented by models such as "balanced scorecard strategy maps", stakeholder cooperation means logically promoting desired outcomes by chemically reacting in more or less the same alignment seen in a value chain. This reaction is casually thought of as a "process" because it represents cooperation as interdependencies -- and then represents interdependencies as a set of serially productive influences. If A then B; if B then C; etc. But a proper understanding of the influences is that the "links in the chain" are actually dimensions, co-existing and intersecting at all times, creating an operating "space" within which the organization tries to find, extend and orientate itself.

In contrast, a "governance" mentality is a more functional outlook than environmental. Closely related to the problem of methodological quality, governance argues that the organization must execute systematically but that its system cannot be managed without enforcing limits on the complexity of its internal interactions. As opposed to the competitiveness that is the ultimate concern of the performance perspective, the governance perspective is ultimately concerned with the effectiveness of the organizational structure in its given configuration.

So what is the argument about effectiveness that governance makes?

II.

Three thoughts lay out the governance view on effectiveness.

(1) Governance and Performance share a strong concern with impacts, but where performance looks at impact from a benefits point of view, governance looks at impact from a risks point of view.

(2) Governance distinguishes effectiveness from impact. "Effective" means that a certain way of doing things is acknowledged and desired for the predictability of its effect. The concept's true significance is in its use for identifying and thus selecting functional options according to a pre-measured balance of value versus risk. (Not all value is beneficial; value is identified as a significant difference, but benefit imposes the requirement that the difference is relevant.)

(3) Governance focuses on the likelihood of the organization's functionality being systematically coherent enough to maximize value while minimizing risk. It's natural elements of disciplinary intelligence are architectures, policies, and approvals -- all of which organize constraints on demand.

Performance, in contrast, concerns itself with "efficiency" -- in terms of how much input is necessary for a given level of output "on-demand". Performance doesn't expect governance to work on efficiency.

But what performance sometimes forgets is that the kind of capacity made available as input (to demand fulfillment) is a product of governance. Poor governance can easily mean poor (or unreliable) input.

In real life, not just in theory, performance's demand on capacity has not been a good thing for businesses lacking governance. The most notable consequences include corrective movements such as Sarbanes-Oxley and the crackdown on software license violations -- as well as gutted share prices and other industry news headliners. Less notable as general news are breakdowns like post-facto productivity failures in mergers, missed time-to-market, or violations of contracted service levels. To an important degree of frequency, these outcomes spring from innovated and improvised execution that has been directed yet disruptive, dedicated but ultimately incoherent.

Governance implements a certain way that real-time functional capacity is produced -- in the same way that fitness and technique combine to power an athlete's responsiveness to opportunities and threats. Ideas, strategies and plans are based on confidence levels in effectiveness.

III.

Governance focuses management on effectiveness by forcefully modeling execution as opposed to just process. Execution is dominated by the decisions that occur before action is taken. Process models assume a certain range of circumstances, but processes must be invoked. Execution is a management function establishing the decision that activates a process. Whether formulaic or improvised, execution precedes process and is primarily attentive to the circumstances that present or argue for the alternatives in hand.

Governance is concerned, therefore, with the quality of the decisions, and with preventing execution from being displaced by process. Here, decision quality refers to the risk/value balances that establish response-capacity on terms predictable by all key stakeholders -- and execution intends to manage impacts and help build benefits accordingly.

The illustration below describes how governance aligns influences on operational behaviors in a way that aligns the generation of impacts with the concerns of stakeholders. As shown here, the key feature of governance is management's attention to control. But the influence of governance pervades several layers of functional predispositions. An important property of the arrangement as illustrated is that it also establishes the semantics for discussing governed response-capacity -- on each layer and in the relationship of the layers to each other.

These semantics do not "cascade" -- not in the sense that the meanings on one layer are derivative of meanings on another layer. Instead, they distinguish what it is about each layer that is most relevant to controlling response-capacity for the best balance of risk and value. As a result, the various layers are logically complementary in their overall influence on the functional coherence of the organization. That is, under governance, the impacts of individual functions do not work at cross-purposes, making response-capacity more reliable under demand.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 6:09 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 24, 2006

Enterprise IT -- Less Filling, Tastes Great

"You know, too much of what passes for Beer around here is just... beer." -- from an ex-New Yorker now a fifteen-year resident of San Francisco bay area.

The arrogant romance that the consumer wants with the product is a great reflection of the enterprise attitude towards IT.

Romance is that funny thing where the reason you're with someone else is because they help you believe that you're the dream version of yourself because you're with them.

See how that works? It's not more difficult than feeling studly in "the right" car, or wearing that fragrance that makes you notice people noticing you.

Far from error-proof, when romance isn't working out there's an aspect of frustration that's like the channel knob on an old radio. Takes you "left to disappointment" or "right to anger".

What about that old "Tone" knob? It moves you from confusion in the low range to aggravation in the high range.

Here's the map of romantic failures... a harsh picture that usually no one wants to see:

You might recognize, somewhere in there, the attitude that someone you know currently harbors towards IT.

But whew, maybe it's not that bad yet. Maybe it's still just at the stage where what you hear is, "You know, a lot of what passes for IT around here is just... IT..."

That's an early warning sign. Being underwhelmed is a common complaint that the business has about IT. They say the cost, unreliability and geekiness of IT really cut down the charm of it's expected potential to fuel (a.) competitive differentiation, (b.) abs or buns of steel, and (c.) the general business mojo.

Now, however, instead of a big breakup, enlightened self-interest in the form of governance is taking hold as the major post-romantic, let's get real, "tough love" stance of business towards IT. "Hey. Just because I can't live without you doesn't mean I'm a chump!"

It's probably a good thing, like having the parent actually set consistent boundaries for the tot. We like that you're precocious, but we want good behavior, and please pick up after yourself.

It may seem like an abrupt transition, though -- going straight from dating to parenting.

But look at it this way: women have had to do that about men for centuries. So here's to business that stops dating IT and starts parenting it. Governance might just be the enterprise growing up enough to let its maternal side come out.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 4:10 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 23, 2006

KM for productivity - driving Decisions versus Recommendations

Does knowledge improve performance?

The default answer should be "Yes". But this makes sense only if certain other things are true.

The fast explanation is that knowledge improves the decision-making that shapes activity -- and with higher-quality activity the intended outputs should be more influential, as planned, on the conditions prerequisite to desired outcomes.

But let's drill deeper. If the shape of the activity is what powers its ability to produce influential output, we seek certain outputs that have explicitly demonstrated their powers to either support or cause the outcomes we want.

That is, we are logically connecting methods to impacts to effects. Indeed, when we pursue high performance, it is the entire set of connections that we need to either design or select... build or buy. Those are the decisions, the ones about what connections to make and what to connect, that are most affected by knowledge.

More specifically, how does knowledge affect those decisions?

An important attitude towards discussing this question is to appreciate the difference between recommendations that are transferrable (aka, content) versus decisions that are knowledgeable (aka, expertise).

In both cases, we have a goal of gaining greater awareness of states, options, implications and consequences. The operational contrast is interesting, however.
- With content, which we procure, we wind up mainly dealing with facts and recommendations.
- With expertise, which we produce, we mainly deal with insights and decisions.

Intuitively and empirically, we know that to get from facts to recommendations might require the intermediary steps of having insights and making decisions -- which is why we think of content as having "embedded expertise". But this just emphasizes that understanding expertise is the starting point for determining where value originates. Thereafter, the value has to be successfully exploited in the work procedure.

To start with, all decisions are choices. Focusing on expertise, the point is that awareness allows subsequent choices to be more logically and accurately indicative of the expectations (e.g. performance) we attach to them.

This awareness may become available before and/or during the effort to make choices. But either way, when we say "better decisions" we are really saying "smarter choices" -- while not yet saying "most desirable outcomes". The fact is that the most desirable outcome (a goal) might not be one to which currently recognizable choices exhibit a very well-founded ("smartest") path. Now if the intent is to have the desired outcome through hell or high water, then the primary challenge is to be more knowledgeable -- literally, to generate more awareness -- so as to further substantiate the choices.

That is, being knowledgeable is a certain kind of behavior that works mainly on information processing -- the kind of thing represented by what is called "business intelligence"... And in that sense, managing "knowledgeability" is a whopping big business, focused on creating timely (and even just-in-time) expertise. Driving it all is the talent for determining what needs to be discovered and then to discover it.

But given that, it's difficult to avoid also positioning knowledgeability as a source of knowledge, and we wind up seeing decisions as a form of knowledge. We communicate them and we repeat them in practice, meaning that they migrate to being recommendations, credible as long as their effects and side-effects prove not to be too negative.

In line with that, prefabricated knowledge that is procured instead of produced has its most common currency in the form of recommendations. Recommendations basically present thoughtful conclusions whose derivation might be tracked back through the information processing that preceded them. But the main difference here between recommendations and decisions is that recommendations emphasize the context of a decision, while decisions per se emphasize the construct (ingredients) of the decision.

We usually study recommendations for their relevance, and basically start with relevance as the filter for selecting and approving them. In contrast, for selecting and approving decisions, we study them to find out how meaning is generated from facts.

The question is, where do users of decisions and recommendations get their pre-dispositions about meaning and relevance -- and what is the process for evolving those into the most productive positions?

If we see decisions and recommendations as being manageable, it follows that we are concerned with organizing how users of decisions and recommendations are led to meanings and relevance.

That guidance initially happens primarily through the requirements issued by defined business processes and tasks, which are the way that the organization provides dynamic structure to business production. The requirements tell users what to look for and why.

Taking note of that, it is evident that "emerging" or "incoming" knowledge then interprets the requirements -- by comparing known previous decisions and recommendations to available current (and especially new) ones.

The results of this comparison may propose changes -- each change having associated cost, risk and benefit that is to be aligned with the objective of the business process or task.

That alignment will usually be evaluated in terms of whether the proposed inputs (cost, risk and benefit) increase the probability and completeness of meeting the objective. This makes for four general evaluations in terms of productivity:
- more likely, with more complete enablement
- less likely, with more complete enablement
- more likely, with less complete enablement
- less likely, with less complete enablement

Those generic flavors of relative productivity usually get specified as detailed formulas pertinent to the particular type of process or task. But the more important point here is to have the visibility on how interpretation of requirements is the leverage point for knowledge to influence productivity.

Interpretation of requirements can have two outcomes itself.
- On the one hand, various ways to meet the incumbent requirements can be discovered, validated, renovated, and so forth.
- On the other hand, the incumbent requirements themselves may be challenged enough to begin changing, towards better correspondence with the process or task objectives.

Therefore, it is important to distinguish productivity from performance.

Performance emphasizes the actual outcomes and whether they are more or less close to the intended outcomes. Performance doesn't give points for doing the wrong thing well.

Productivity, however, emphasizes the effectiveness of the manner in which the actual outcomes were generated.

High performance is fostered by high productivity, but they are not synonymous. Under a relatively unchanging model of high-performance, productivity may be accomplished in different ways at different times or places. What high performance wants is for an underlying productivity to enjoy agility -- as a way to assure that the high performance might be sustained against changing situations.

To imbue agility in the productivity, knowledge has a key role to play -- namely, finding alternative effective manners, on a timely basis, for fostering and generating desired outcomes. As the business need for agility increases, the role of knowledge becomes more and more critical and valuable. Making that role effective is what knowledge management is all about.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 9:21 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 22, 2006

What Kind of ROI Do You Need?

In the table below, investment objectives (target outcomes) are laid out to identify how the organization addresses its three major functional concerns: recovery, health and growth. Growth, health and recovery are top-level categories of investment -- a portfolio-level consideration.

But the view presented in this table is meant to convey something different. It assumes that every investment is understood to be a change to the status quo on some level. Moreover, the "return" on the investment is a qualty of various outcomes that, after being balanced against each other, clearly promotes a new overall state that is preferred to the pre-investment state. This would be true whether the main issue is growth, health, or recovery, so the understanding is less circumstantial and more essential.

In this scheme, preferential outcomes pertinent to the main goal would be declared (populating the table), and the influence of the investment (which after all is a catalyst) would be directed at those targets -- making management the critical success factor of the investment.

As laid out by the table's dimensions, four quadrants identify different general modes of activity by which the investment in question can be sub-categorized. The point here is that a single investment can be influential in multiple ways. Care should be taken to identify whether the intended influence is the most likely one; meanwhile, there may be more than one significant influence concurrently.

This second general level of identification allows two important considerations. One, it offers more direct association with other organization-wide priorities already given to these different ways. And two, it invites comparing the implications of the investment in question against pre-existing or alternative mechanisms -- ones that might themselves intend to change something to the same end or by the same mode. (These might be, for example: legacy processes; organizational partners; competing proposed investments; already-active projects; etc.)

In yet more detail, the 4x4 table generates up to sixteen different opportunities for outcomes that might be identified as significant attributes of the investment's influence. Examples are easy to come by: it's not difficult to envision Standards at the lower left and Innovation at the upper right; likewise, Collaboration at the upper left and Customization at the bottom right. While those examples are not intended here to be recommendations, nor pigeon-holed, they represent a level of decription that should apply to the definition of what kind of change is likely involved in the management of the investment. That is, management should look to see how many of these sixteen issues are logically associated with the activity that the investment will catalyze, and perform some forecasting as well as compatibility and risk assessments. (Or else! We all know that the law of unintended consequences is in effect...) Knowing what the investment will support or inhibit is basic to establishing the business case fror the investment.

Overall, the table makes no assumption about how much time elapses between the present state (or start) and the target future (or recognition of the achievement goal). Not only can influences occur simultaneously on multiple target attributes, but the cycle-time from stimulus to impact can vary widely from one attribute to the next. In fact, it is again management that will both predetermine and regulate the cycle times, and management that must plan the influences for real-time accountability -- as well as reconciliation and intervention, where necessary.

Meanwhile, the table suggests one other aspect of the presumed value of an investment. For example, some investments have influence that is more on the immediate security (assurance) of the organization's economy while others weigh more on future possibilities. (The table indicates the former near the lower left, and the later near the upper right. In like fashion, other variants are indicated as well.) The table encourages us to look out for this, but in practice, it will be true only to the extent that management allows -- in exactly the same sense that a complex product will deliver its functional power only to the extent that it is allowed by its actual implementation.

The analogous idea of implementing an investment can be instrumental to understanding why the investment value should be anticipated in terms of managed change. "Implementation" is a model for controlling the influence of the investment across the various opportunities for economic impact. The picture below illustrates this idea of control, but makes it equally clear that control can be very complex and potentially very difficult.

Again, the value proposition of an investment is essentially a proposed change to the status quo. The change being pursued is a significant (beneficial) difference realized in stages (upper blue row, left-to-right) that progressively translate the difference from potential into reality. Each stage has inherent challenges to overcome, although the challenge may be great or small depending on the particular proposal and environment of stakeholders.

During that transition, issues perceived to affect the opportunity cost (associated with the investment) compete with the effectiveness of the change stages. These issues (lower blue row) may force adjustments of the change element in their respective phases, which can alter the scale, scope or logic of the initial proposal.

In general, this picture displays a principle that all value comes with risk, and that choosing value means choosing risk as well. Although not always detailed in the explanation of an investment, the built-in competition of risk factors with change progress is a predeterminant of the possible levels of return on the investment. Thus, active management is how return is generated to desired target levels.

Summarizing that active management, the four terms across the bottom of the picture, corresponding with the change phases, identify efforts in which the realization of the investment's value can break down. These terms also correspond with the four terms across the top of the picture that label the achievement objective of each change phase -- that is, what gets done without a breakdown.

In this discussion, return on investment is a phenomenon reliant on an organization's ability to take responsibility for the dynamics that create the path to deivering relevant benefits. The picture strongly reflects the experience of a manager of the investment navigating and balancing delivery opportunities and constraints. Those factors can easily be a blend of internal organizational issues and external environmental ones (markets, other stakeholders, etc.) -- which are not specified in the discussion but are not so difficult to locate in the scheme presented.

Seen as the result of a constellation of economic impacts, ROI is meaningful in the same way that the temperature of a given day or region is meaningful: it expresses a characteristic of an environment in which we might choose to operate, and it can strongly influence our choice depending on whether it inhibits our plans or not.

But the prevailing interest in ROI treats it as a specification of a building component of a protective shelter to be constructed in the environment -- and this is because we want the shelter to be the environment.

This disparity accounts for much of the confusion about whether ROI is a good measure for what should or should not be done -- because final outcomes (the reality of life in the environment) often do not match predictions. To steer clear of that confusion, the most important thing that management can do about ROI is to demonstrate what expectations about construction can logically be cost-effectively aligned with the requirements for strategically leveraging the expected environment.

This calls for managers to be the architects of return on investments -- and, well, they should be.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 6:19 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 21, 2006

Culture as Brand

Here's a thought: large companies have the problem of peering into the crystal ball, while small companies have the problem of functioning in a fishbowl.

What does that mean? Large companies act like they are picking the market; small companies act like the market is picking them. Both cases, tough situations for them to handle.

Ironically, the lip-service in each case is usually reversed. At least when these companies are facing their funders, large companies talk about being picked, and small companies talk about doing the picking. Interesting how things switch when the issue is asking for money instead of taking it.

Thinking of the small start-ups and non-profits that I've worked with (not exclusively!) over the years, I'm reminded that both of them frequently struggle with another interesting choice. They might have multiple value propositions riding on the same competency, or they might have only one value prop that anyone cares about, and must shift amongst multiple competencies in order to continue delivering the goods. My experience with them is that the more the outfit needs money, the more it sends multiple competencies at one value prop -- whilst the more it already has money, the more it imagines that one competency is wonderfully fertile. This is related to the market targeting issue, but it's more directly concerned with competing after the targeting has been done.

Related to that, I notice that we usually try to imagine branding as being a cause versus being an effect. That is, if brand is what we want buyers to think we think we're about, how do we make the many things that we do cause them to see us one way? Or are we simply at the mercy of whatever random things they do to see us?

Mulling over branding a few years back, and thinking about companies that can't see themselves the way customers see them, I hit a point regarding the vast difference between "positioning" and "position" -- hardly a new topic. I suddenly had the thought that to close the gap, the real purpose of a business is to create customers, while the purpose of a customer is to create products.

The realization came from an imaginary dialogue:

Company: "I'm doing this *for You*
Prospect: "Yes, but are you doing it *this way* ?"
Company: "Well, what do I get if I do?"
Prospect: "You get *me*..."


Think about how persuasive it is to be able to tell an audience what kind of customer you make -- which is what we can think of as the "cause" aspect of branding. Prospects would say "I want to be like your other customers" and so the reputation helps you to make more customers. (Good positioning!)

The "effect" aspect is more about the product (or likewise service) that actually gets made. Although the catalyst for the product is the customer, the bottom line is that the company winds up making the product for itself and finding out later if it's good enough to sell. Prospects say "I require something of a certain type" and their scrutiny of your product/service ranks you (leaves you) somewhere in their consciousness. (Position, for better or worse.)

At any rate, those thoughts boil down to the idea that the prospect defines the opportunity by expressing their *preference*, so you market to the preference. Moreso, as savvy salespeople know, the preference reflects an "assumed identity", and the same prospect could turn into several different customers.

Putting it in the context of revenue growth through superior competition, such differences seem to point at segmentation. It's quite interesting to imagine that one given potential buyer might be a customer simultaneously in different segments, but this is something to think about especially in terms of what customer relationship management must address. Frankly, it must address culture -- which is the empirical evidence that the prospect's multiple personalities make sense to them...

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 1:53 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 20, 2006

A Comprehensive Governance Framework

Why Governance?

Institutional control is a matter not only of doing things "correctly" but doing the proper things correctly. And, we want to control the institution in a way that is itself institutionalized -- just as a mature person would normally control themselves in accordance with appropriate principles of behavior that should be habits of character.

But what is it about an organization that particularly needs governing?

If the organization is a "business", then the motives of a business will drive organizational activity and the point is to steer those activities in principled ways that actually help the business.

The framework below sets the high-level business motives (across the top) as the outlook on key focal-points of the organization's management.

One set of points -- competency, policy, and strategy -- together describe the organization's makeup stretching from what it knows how to do on over to what it should do and finally what it has decided to do. In effect, this describes the current predisposition that the organization brings to its work every day.

The other set of points -- strategic development, operational availability, and transactional consistency -- summarize the organization's major proactive mechanisms for generating "delivery of value" to stakeholders. This is more like the organization's position (not to be confused with positioning).

The balancing act between the organization's predisposition and its position can be seen as a basic behavioral phenomenon demonstrating what the organization knows about how to translate its potential into reality. (Of course, this should include some consideration of whether the current potential is desirable and/or needs changing.)

Given those two axes, the framework looks at the internal structure of the organization for the key contributors that govern relevant business activities -- that is, what it actually winds up doing.

A key observationof the framework is that the organization's capacity to respond to opportunity and demand is hugely shaped by the coherence of its governance. While a lack of governance does not preclude notable capacity, the exact lesson learned in business between 2001 and 2006 is that risk factors in responsiveness can make existing capacity more of a liability (dot.bombs, Enron, etc.) than a benefit. This makes the influence of governance a major force to be leveraged in value management.

At the high level, this is referenced through the framework by its correspondence of the organization's processes, services and portfolios to the goals for progress, production, and achievement.

Naturally, real organizations are not governed only in terms of the intersecting issues presented here. However, governance must attempt to identify the most critical types of decisions to attend to at the various locations and levels of the organizational structure. A primary objective of the framework is to describe the sources and flow of information that can sufficiently account for the effectiveness of the organizational structure.

In that regard, a management ability (BPM) to associate competency and policy exploits certain types of information that can organize appropriate behavior. In like fashion, an ability (BI) to discover and exploit value-laden opportunities for that type of behavior keeps the governance in service to the goals of the business.

The final note for this introductory discussion is that the framework is intentionally abstract so as to allow it to be applied to organizational units of widely differing scale and flavor. There is no reason why a small business unit would have less of a need for governance, and no logical reason why the essential points of governance would be different. Instead, the most likely difference is in the level of awareness that the business unit has about what kind of opportunity governance would bring to the unit if successfully instituted. This is not intended to make any point about the intricacy of particular best practices in governance applied and distinguished between "corporate" or "IT", "profit" or "non-profit", and so forth. Those practices are rightfully derived from the communications needs held by stakeholders in the responsibilities that distinguish their domains from each other. Yet the framework presented above argues for the similarity of management across those domains, and calls out for a certain breadth of awareness that is about explaining why control becomes valuable.

For a related discussion of IT Governance in particular, see the article Surveying IT Governance by clicking here.

For an in-depth discussion of related value-creation issues, click here to see the article, The Business Creation of IT Value, which looks at how business management takes the organizationof IT and develops it to support the business position. While this is not strictly an example of implementing governance in IT, as a followup to the discussion here it illustrates how the problem of "Business-IT alignment" works out in overlapping areas of governance and resource optimization.

Indeed, if we look at coordinating the issues of managing organizational behaviors and resources, we return to the earlier observation that there is a correspondence of the organization's processes, services and portfolios to the (governed) goals for progress, production, and achievement. Seeing "IT" as a corporate resource, the correspondence might be articulated (see illustration here) as an allocation of IT organization responsibilities to those three aspects of the business position.

The thought it leaves us with is the question of how running IT "for" the Business relates to running IT "as" a business, and how business governance and business strategy connects to IT governance and IT strategy. From the framework introduced in this discussion, the indication is that strategy is an area in which governance has an influence -- and that influence is likely to shape Business objectives in ways that IT's influence will have to respect. Thus, IT's own governance will have to establish IT's business-like predisposition and position for compatibility with the way the Business's objectives are meant to be addressed.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 1:27 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Alignment, Coordination, Integration and Lifecycle

Business presumes that relevant achievements on a sustained basis will bring success.

Relevance is often a matter of timing as well as being very sensitive to the periods and duration of elapsed time. Without changing anything about itself, an organization's achievements may change in relevance simply because of who is paying attention from outside of the organization.

Sustainability is different. Functional organizations can be distinguished from dysfunctional ones in ways that do not begin with measuring their outcomes. Functional organizations are not always successful performers, but good performance itself is not a guarantee that the organization has avoided being dysfunctional.

Performance is part of relevance; targets or goals are provided as the perspective from which achievement is interpreted, so a suitable level of ability to achieve is as wide ranging as is the "stretch" of the targets from easy to hard. The big issue is about who sets the targets. As we say, "who's calling the shots"...

But as we know, just setting targets doesn't cause success. Our attention invariably dwells on what mechanisms we need for reaching the target.

Discussions about alignment therefore have two flavors.
- One considers issues from a design perspective: should a certain arrangement of elements and components logically suffice for the desired purpose?
- The other considers execution: should the typical activity of the mechanism likely meet the requirements

The second consideration, execution, itself has two flavors. One considers whether the mechanism is "keeping the target in its sights"; the other considers whether the mechanism, composed of many parts, is structurally sound enough in the real-time of effort (that is, actually constructed well enough) to get the job done. Today, these are both usually referred to as Alignment.

Although it is strangely rare these days to hear it called otherwise, both flavors of "alignment" are simply the issue of co-operation.

In the execution sense, which is essentially about quality, the combination of technique and management coordinates the parts for a unified, systematic cooperation. By coordination, it's meant that all parts conform their availability and output to the pertinent requirements of a common objective. No two parts need to be similar, but all must be explicitly assigned to the operation that meets the objective. Coordination is the most actively managed form of cooperation, and it is the form that is easiest to change.

The efficiency and security of that coordination is largely dependent on what level of readiness the coordinator finds the elements or components to have for the sake of their being combined. Combination unifies separate parts, but again for the sake of real-time confidence in the effort we normally see integration employed. Integration prefabricates the readiness of the parts, establishing their suitable availability independently of the actual frequency of demand or use.

Integration makes a big assumption, however, which is that the condition of each of the parts stays within a range of tolerances that allow the integration to persist. Managing the condition of the parts means attending to their lifecycles of arrival, interaction, ageing, and replacement or removal. Essentially, this lifecycle management is strategic to the maintenance of integrations that optimize coordination -- resulting in alignment.

But what about ad hoc coordination that does not rely on integration?

Lifecycle management prepares for ad hoc coordination by managing changes within a part's lifecycle according to predictions about future coordinations and the utilization that those predictions suggest. For each predicted use of the part, its degree of usability is certifiable at each of its lifecycle stages.

An architecture typically contains a documentation of the predictions and can produce part specifications that identify the quality tolerances for the anticipated use.

Lifecycle Management's benefit flows through architecture and integrations into real-time coordination.


Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 5:00 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 17, 2006

Executive Agenda for IT

In the diagram below, we have a bird's eye view on the major business initiatives reconfiguring the management of the enterprise's reliance on the IT infrastructure.

The view identifies that the key high-level motives of the organization are related in certain ways.

The enterprise wants to maximize the value of its autonomy and identity through decisions and actions that:
- differentiate itself in the market,
- optimize its modes of establishing impact and presence there,
- sustain the mechanisms that it uses to do so, and
- control the dynamics of its organization's internal makeup and external behaviors.

These possibilities are systemically related to each other. That is represented by the perspectives that are used to monitor the general states and conditions that presuppose the enterprise's health and/or growth. These perspectives -- governance, performance, architecture, and security -- collectively describe the approaches and models for monitoring the enterprise. The general understanding sought is of whether the way the the organization has chosen to structure itself and to act is viable for achieving its intended goals in the environment it has chosen to inhabit.

Also shown in the picture is the prominent place that stakeholders have between processes and performance.
Likewise, the key intermediary position between security and processes is typically occupied by policies.
The chain of influence formed by their inclusion explains how security is linked to performance -- meaning that the enterprise continually must balance the opportunities to which it commits against the constraints that it can recognize.

For the time being, though, this discussion focuses on the chain of influence that runs between the enterprise's two more overtly discretionary states. Governance and Architecture are both highly complex but they are also more fully synthetic designs than are security and performance, because they are less dependent on external forces to realize and maintain their intended design. As such, they are closer to the issue of the competency and maturity of the organization that can be established directly by management. The picture above expresses the target competency and maturity through identifying issues such as that standards mediate the dependency of processes on infrastructure, or that change mediates the production of infrastructure from architecture.

Taking this picture as a bird's-eye view on the top "surface" of the enterprise's structure, what lies underneath are layers of composition, for example such as "assets". The picture shown here allows us to consider enterprise assets in terms of each motive, perspective and linkage illustrated, detecting discontinuities and strengths of impact. While financial evaluations, functional evaluations (which include intangible assets), and physical evaluations of assets are already three ways to understand how assets become enterprise resources, we see more clearly in the picture here the circumstances in which any of that matters. Likewise, operations, relationships, and strategies are each layers to be interpreted.

The presumption of the different underlying layers highlights that the terms shown in the picture are necessarily abstract -- but it is that very abstractness that allows us to understand that they influence each other in an "essential" way, not just a circumstantial way. Understanding the enterprise from this model is mainly an act of interpretations. For example:
- From an organizational viewpoint, it's not hard to see the organization defining itself in terms of the linkages such as rules, systems, services, etc. by which it institutionalizes itself for attending to the primary motives.
- From a practices viewpoint, it's not difficult to understand from the picture things such as that compliance is a management responsibility that derives from the influence of rules, policies and requirements.
- From a disciplinary viewpoint, BI and BPM have evident locations and sensibly share influence on agreements or "contracts" by discovering and then formalizing the conditions for assuring appropriate deliveries.

While the abstractions and their interpretations cover a wide range of management phenomena and business objects, we'll always eventually wind up back at the huge reliance that the business has on information technology in order to just stay on the playing field. As a result, it is appropriate for IT executives to interpret IT plans, operations and impacts with this same picture of the enterprise, acknowledging that the portfolio of IT implementations can be evaluated for its completeness and effectiveness by considering how much support is being generated for the alignment and balancing of the items in the picture.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 3:49 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 16, 2006

Does Different Software Make a Difference?

He who forgets the past is doomed to repeat it...

That's not an inviting scenario for companies that decided to get rid of old software in order to improve costs and productivity.

"Goodbye, and Good Riddance!" was the attitude, and why not? Typically, the understanding was that older software was keeping important work from being done because:
- it didn't have the right features, or...
- it had the right features but its method was too involved or complicated, or...
- it worked fine but it no longer was covered by a support agreement whereas newer stuff would be.

Those conditions eventually got discovered if only due to difficult events cropping up with ongoing usage. The decision to intentionally change was well founded by evidence.

But taking the pain first wasn't the only way to handle it. We could also have anticipated each of those three problems -- and actually scheduled them right out of the "future problem" zone.

So it seems, anyway... but there are complications in trying to do that. For example:

- Changes in the users themselves can make features suddenly seem more or less appropriate.

- Training and Standards streamline patterns of usage but are both more difficult to come by after the software is already in company circulation. Demand for the software to spread is typically much higher and faster than the acceptance of training or standards.

- Most software gets under-utilized; but the part of the feature set that gets the most use becomes more than familiar enough to continue on after support agreements have unnoticeably expired.

And the final twist is that the software lives on the hardware -- so hardware decisions very often wind up becoming defacto decisions about the location and type of software. For example, if the hardware walks out the door, so might some software! Or if the hardware gets upgraded, the old software might not be able to keep up. Finally, can the new software be used without having new hardware first?

This means that newer software, bought and implemented, may be trying to add benefits on top of unsolved ills.

If new software and/or upgrades are to be done in a way that can handle our intentions and the complications that get in their way, there must be a breadth of awareness that requires information pooled from a variety of sources.

Let's look at an example of how this awareness, or planning perspective, results from the information pooling. Our perspective will be built with the following:

- Purchase plans
- Vendor records
- Employee records
- Distribution records
- Support records
- Budget and expense records

First, a general overview: the sequence of this group of records allows us to trace the life of the software as it changed from being someone's property other than the company's, into property company owned or contracted. It also traces the availability of the software from a period when that was a supplier problem to when it was a company problem. As we watch the meaning of "owner" and "available" change over time, we can see why the change happens -- but we can also recognize that earlier meanings often get forgotten or demoted as later meanings take over. In other words, things that are still true about the software fall out of sight, out of mind. But if those forgotten conditions can still exert influence, chances are that they will.

Next, some specifics. In each of those different kinds of records, imagine (or confirm) how one particular piece of software is uniquely identified. Identification rules might exist for each different type of record, but do any of those rules intentionally support preserving the identity of the same unique piece of software across different kinds of records? Who within the company creates the rules that do that? What do they expect to get from using those rules?

Now, for the effort to handle our new intent and the complications that underlie them, we need to figure out how the old stuff might compete with the new stuff. We can look at that in three ways:
(1) Fiscal -- what kinds of dollar-related issues are still associated with the software?
(2) Physical -- what options and restrictions exist on where the software is and should be?
(3) Functional -- what certainty do we have about why the software is being used the way it currently is?

And in every case, the challenge is to be able to get reliable answers in a reliable way.

For most of those questions, getting the answers requires identifying certain decision-makers, finding out how they make decisions, and finding out how they prove that their decisions were executed and maintained. That will push us into the records.

This often turns up a lot of inefficiency at best, or chaos and contradiction at worst. Those problems have to be minimized, because they are at the root of why old software can come back to sabotage expectations about new software being helpful. And what everyone needs to remember is that new software becomes old software, too.

If a collection of reliable data from those sources can be consolidated, it can then be analyzed to find patterns that indicate where upgrades or new software can most likely have an impact. The probable degree of impact should also begin to surface as a matter of how hard it is to eliminate barriers represented by old software or, jujitsu-style, to exploit its current attributes (fiscal, physical or functional).

Finally, as the hub (if not the holding tank) of the consolidated information, the software inventory should be available as the primary thinking tool for planning change from the old to the new.

With that emphasis on analyses that improve planning, many organizations might want to revisit the reports that are currently published from the software inventory -- and assess whether those reports are really helping to manage things as opposed to merely tracking them.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 7:58 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 15, 2006

Just the Facts, Ma'am

Ever play "Telephone"? You know, the game where someone whispers a message into another person's ear, and that person has to whisper the message to the next person, and the chain of whispers goes on person after person until the last person is asked, "What's the message?" This is usually where everyone's funnybone gets whacked, when the answer turns out to be entirely goofy as a transmission of the original message.

Looking at the data in your software inventory can have all the same fun and excitement -- of knowing the validity of the info you're getting is... laughable!

All you have to do is (1) keep no track of how many times the information was transferred, and (2) not care where it started out. Easy!

Sure enough, for thousands of organizations, it is really amazing how "entertaining" the inventory is to business users.

But on the other hand, if you are the person who is held responsible for the data, you probably have a lot less interest in this game. It's almost criminal how hard it is to fix the business mistakes and misunderstandings that can grow from the unreliability of the information.

The problem is, as the game demonstrates, that when garbage out goes on to become garbage in somewhere else, the mistakes get magnified.

Where are the likely "garbage in" points in your company?

IT industry research organizations like Forrester, Gartner, and the Standish Group routinely bring up three major points where business leans on IT for information inputs: architecture, projects and support. Not only is each of these subject to being spoiled by bad information, but the relationship of the three to each other can magnify their individual damages.

Why are they so vulnerable? Because each one has a major design component that is what makes it of any further beneficial use – and the design is based on the information inputs. Bad info leads to incorrect design, which leads to incompatibilities with the ultimate business purpose. These incompatibilities include mistakes like:
- making something incorrectly, which because it doesn't work leads to re-work just to get it finished;
- making something with poor quality, which leads to breakdowns; and,
- making the wrong thing, which leads to disposal;

Add the time, money and potential aggravation involved, and it's easy to see where impatience and anger make the difficulties bigger than just the difficulty per se.

Popularly, it is believed to cost 90% less to prevent a problem than it does to fix it. Ben Franklin probably made the idea popular (a stitch in time saves nine) but it keeps getting proved again in things like software programming and medicine.

As it turns out, software inventory information can likely be the key culprit of those major corporate mishaps, but is also a likely candidate to be the prevention hero for such problems.

Three areas where the corporate "entertainment" value of bad inventories becomes criminally difficult to reverse are in penalties -- from failure to meet contracts, failure to meet the law, and failure to maintain security of corporate data. These can be very substantial risks.

(1) Contracts assume certain capabilities to deliver, which depend on processes with high levels of reliability. But that reliability depends on technology configurations that must execute functions properly on demand.

(2) Laws state that companies have only certain rights to use technologies in certain ways, but in the heat of competition, corporate user behaviors may be unconcerned or unaware of the restrictions.

(3) Confidentiality underlies much of what turns a company's knowledge and difference into an advantage. It's just too hard to run the plays when the opponent already knows what you're going to do, and what you're going to do it with. Software is how you get to your information; it's how they get to it, too. Ideally, they don't get their hands on your software...

These are three different issues, having particular software management solutions but solutions that are enabled by inventory information.
- Version control and delivery puts a foundation under contracts.
- Delivery and authorization keeps users within the safety zone of usage rules.
- Authorization and tracking keeps tabs on where those software stepping stones are that lay down paths between information and info users.

The overlap in the solution approaches is not an accident. Furthermore, it doesn't stop there. Tracking confirms what versions are actually under control or not -- immediately implying certain things about the effectiveness of planning, changes and acquisitions as currently practiced.

Overall, the point is to have the right software in the right place at the right time for the right reason.

When those four qualifications are met simultaneously, risk has been minimized. But this is a point that may never be reached or long-lasting for all situations. Since the business is by nature a dynamic affair, requirements and circumstances keep changing and present the need for adjustments in how software is involved. Managing risk has a goal of minimizing it in total, but the process is about being continuously proactive to keep it from growing where it wasn't already and doesn't have to. For that effort to be efficient, the relevant information must be accurate.

The pressure on the IT organization is to ensure that the data in the software inventory is always capable of expressing when certainty about risk has been lost, and expressing with certainty the facts about whatever is wherever it is and how it got there when it did.


Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 3:39 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 14, 2006

The Sources of Software ROI

Be careful what you ask for: you might get it!

That's what everyone needs to know about ROI.

ROI is a term that everyone intuitively understands but -- as often as not -- can misinterpret. The generic interpretation of ROI is nothing more nor less than a formula that describes how we expect value to come from spending. But that means being careful about what it is that we consider to be "value" as well as "expense".

One interesting task that carefulness suggests is to catalog how different kinds of expense match up to different kinds of value. This will show a set of many-to-many relationships. Consequently, what comes to the surface is that there are lots of different stories to tell about whether people are getting their money's worth or not.

In telling those stories, one factor to discuss up front is the difference between "cost and "expense". Expense is a budget issue that relies on approvals. Cost is a financing issue that relies on strategy. We don't want expenses to undermine the financing strategy, but too often an expense is the beginning of something that winds up costing a lot more than expected.

Meanwhile, what about "value"? We know from experience that what is valuable for one party may not be seen as such by another. This occurs because the nature of value lies in the importance that is attached to some distinction that has been made. Many parties can agree on what distinction was made, or in other words, what change took place; but unless those parties all have the same needs and circumstances, the importance of the change is likely to differ, in level and/or implications, from one party to the next.

So when it comes to ROI, what we really look at is how certain reasons for expenses would be associated with certain kinds of expectations about impacts.

For example, wIth software, the typical association is between the purchase justification of ownership and the predicted risk/benefit of its usage. That's a one-to-one relationship, but different parties experience different benefits. So it's as if the software is associated with any number of expectations, some more clearly or strongly than others. Likewise, an impact may have multiple sources.

In effect, there can be many different combinations of such reasons and expectations -- some apparently more preferable, logical or validated than others. Indeed, those are three attitudes that can help explain differing parties' often different perception of importance and therefore of value.

Normally, no one pursues combinations that don't have some positive attribute.

However, in cataloging already accepted reasons, expectations, and combinations that the organization either proves to have or claims to have:

- Sometimes the matchups are ones that just don't fit the policies of the organization. When it comes to the purchase and subsequent use of software, these stories tend to include issues with missing or disorganized support, and with potential theft.

- Some matchups don't seem likely to occur even if they are desired, due to organizational structure or processes that crowd them out. These stories point at issues like legacy implementations -- and legacy decisions, too -- that compete with change. And on the flip side, issues here include unproven new software, prematurely deployed.

- Some matchups are more under the control of users than providers, or vice versa, and there may be a question as to whose administration is better and/or whether the real control is actually the way it is generally believed to be. Here, key software issues involved include a lack of standards -- or disagreements -- in accountability for the condition or configuration of things.

Companies try to protect ROI with their policies, processes, and administration -- but it is not unusual that pressures from competition (that is, needs) or from business performance evaluations (results) can provoke isolated decisions that create misalignment between them.

So, one problem we find amongst these stories is ROI "erosion". Between the reason for software being bought, the habits for using it, and the ways it actually affects the organization, the value proposition gets worn down.

Software Management has an important objective of protecting the software value proposition against erosion, so that the software's potential ROI can be realized.

To offer this protection, management must be able to confirm that any practiced combinations of purchase reasons and demonstrated impacts are:
- documented, trackable, and reasonable; plus,
- prioritized, supportable, and improvable.

In the first set of confirmations, evidence is king. In the second, agreed requirements are the key.

Often the second set is practically impossible (or pointless) without success in the first set. This puts the emphasis on having, through the first set, a reliable reference record that accurately communicates not just what is available but why it is.

The software inventory is at least a concept that satisfies the role of being the reference record or database.

Many known complications with software inventory are due to the fact that records are created and maintained by many different parties for different reasons, which might later resist being well consolidated. Records maintenance also may vary in its diligence, completeness, or other quality levels -- according to who is doing it and why. Often this is tolerated because the standards for accounting are not demanding anything more. So one of the first things that must happen to drive a change in records maintenance is an explicit company need for standardization.

Standardization really means that everyone understands how their piece of record-keeping fits with pieces that must be maintained by others. Like with a protocol for a network, each part understands what the other part means. As a result, the parts do not all have to be in the same place, but they all have to speak the same language or use the same grammar. With software reference records, the grammar is a data model that all record-keepers share.

Going along with that is a move beyond accounting to analysis. By itself, accounting does not express the importance of the many-to-many relationships between what software is present and what it is actually doing. So, accounting does not talk about ROI. Not understanding ROI means not having one of the most essential ways of evaluating whether current software is helping or hurting -- and whether change should or should not occur. So what we look for is a chance to do analysis by being able to correlate impact data with reliable accounting data. This highlights the significance of getting control over the inventory -- which becomes a driver for a standardized data model.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 2:38 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 13, 2006

Why You Pay Too Much

One of our colleagues likes to say "My favorite kinds of problems are Other People's Problems and Problems That Go Away By Themselves!"

Some people think that software purchases can get put in there. It might be a department or project with its own "big stick" budget, damn the corporate delays. Poof! More stuff. Different stuff. Cool. Or, it might be annoyed users, hands hovering priestly over hard-to-support legacy stuff, softly chanting "upgrade"... Poof!

But back on planet Earth, lawyers, support teams and vendors see unexamined, untracked software purchases as The Problem That Won't Go Away. And when CFO Magazine runs a feature on taming the costs of software, you know the "Business" is not waiting any longer for "IT" to make things better. CFOs all believe a sales genius named PT Barnum, who told them that "a fool and his money are soon parted." Taking a cue from them, let's get a quick rundown on what the top sources of cost problems are and why they persist.

1. Shopping fatigue. After bruising technology selection projects, everyone is determined to have the winner show up. Tolerance replaces discretion. Bruising vendor selections? Please, not now.

2. More shopping fatigue. After spending 20 to 30 years learning algebra, your company's buyers watch software vendor contracts show up requiring expertise in chaos theory. "Doh!"

3. Inexperience. As CFO pointed out, why would an internal procurement person who does a big deal every blue moon be able to stay on the field with a sales guy who does it all day every day? You've gotta ask yourself a question: "Do I feel lucky?" Well, do ya, punk?

4. Terror. If your company already ran the gauntlet with one vendor, it paid the price of admission and has the scars to prove it. Why run it again with a different vendor just to get back into the same room? No thanks, I'll keep the captor I already overpay!

5. Money! If you didn't need money to get software, software wouldn't cost so much! Yeah, that sounds ridiculous, but the way you get money to buy things is by asking for it. Have you reviewed the budgeting process lately? If you think you need $50K but you can only get $30K, and then you spend the $30K to try to do $50K of business impact, you could either wind up being 40% less productive than you promised, or you might stretch that $30K of software to 166% of its legal capacity. What's the chance your company did one of those two things? Back to the CFO article again for this quote from Attorney Robert Scott: "I can tell you that 100% of the Fortune 1000 are at risk for this..." And those are the guys with the BIG bucks.

6. Software! Why does software cost so much? Because it's SOFT. Like ideas, like luck, like... recipes. There's they way it was supposed to be, and then there's the way it turns out to be, often with a lot of mystery in between, according to who touched it. Not knowing who touched it, and why, becomes the main way to lose track of whether it's going to keep doing what it is supposed to do.

7. Efficiency. What?! Well here's how that works. See items 5 and 6 above, and think "Let's roll out a common image across all the desktops." The law of unintended consequences says that if this is done only as a bandaid, it will create two new problems for every one that it solves.

These are all diferent from each other in a recognized way, but they all contribute to the same kind of problems: omissions, defects and errors that keep you from having the most appropriate software in the right place at the best time.

That mismatch creates three specific kinds of money problems:
(1) lost savings,
(2) extra expenses, and
(3) wasted investment.

If you're the IT department, the good news is that you're not the source of most of those problems. The bad news is that IT has to make the problem go away -- partner with the CFO or else just watch it all get worse.

Three things IT can do to help CFOs be happy:
- IT can help lawyers be sure about what the company is really entitled to, and fortify the company's legal rights and protections.
- IT can help Support teams benefit from less mystery and complexity in tracking down software types and matching them to operating requirements and knowledge.
- Largely due to the above, IT can help turn Vendors into co-operators who use the same game plan that the company uses and who get paid to power the plan with only the right stuff at the right times.

How can IT deliver those bonuses to those groups? Take on the three areas that expenses like to grow in.
- things that arrive before they should have;
- things that change when they shouldn't; and,
- things that leave before anyone knows it.

This will turn out to be your business case for real software inventory management.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 3:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 11, 2006

The Beauty of Bias

It's said that in a service relationship, the worst kind of customer is the one that screams, "I don't know what I want, but I'm not gettin' it!"

We try to be good customers by at least getting advice beforehand to help us figure out what we want. Usually the focus is on getting an accurate fix on which products really do what they claim, and of those, which one is the best one.

That said, we go to industry analysts, and we expect them to help us avoid buyer's remorse.

So, industry anaysts have clients. What does this tell us? Mainly, that you should hire an analyst in the same spirit that you would hire a lawyer! When you are the client, advocacy is the essence of the analyst's effectiveness.

A great analyst is one that can both tell you what you ought to know and tell you what you want to hear. An analyst that can do that is only able to because they understand you and they understand what you're up against. As a client, you shouldn't demand less than that.

But the point of hearing both things is to be able to evaluate the gap between the two. Ultimately, that evaluation is the correct basis for your decision.

Logically, it's somewhat pointless to have only one side of the story or the other, since that doesn't leave you with much to evaluate.

And realistically, if you are not actually a client of the analyst but instead only an observer, then you are not entitled to any more "objectivity" than you are willing to diligently pursue yourself -- by developing great perspective through your own research.

Granted, research is difficult and time-consuming, so it makes sense to go get credible research from people who do that for a living. The trick, then, is to find research that really does what it says it does, and of that, pick the best research.

But what makes for the "best" research?

The typical answer points at the research that has the most accurate, reliable answers. But it's so easy to forget that the answers only make sense because the right questions were asked in the first place.

What are the right questions?

The right questions, to begin with, are the ones that investigate the reasons why you are the one having the problem that you think you have. That self-assessment, which perhaps gets done with the help of consultants, leads to ways of stating the problem (to the analysts) that are more specifically and rationally associated with known characteristics of known solutions. From there, the analyst can become your advocate, by screening out irrelevant options.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 9:05 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Linking Economy to Profitability

After a five-year pendulum swing of spending to cutting to spending, we've managed to stretch across four chapters of the IT-Business relationship: Y2K, dot.bombing, BackToBasics, and now Compliance Versus TheTopLine.

In these chapters, the story of transitions also features patterns overlaying other patterns.

For example, over the phases, we'd see that:
- the role of an IT infrastructure was swinging from being a risk factor to a success factor, back to risk, and back again to success. Meanwhile...
-The business model credibility was swinging from supply-chain angst to demand chain angst, back to supply, and back again to demand.

With patterns like those to find and juxtapose, there is plenty of room for examination of cause-effect relationships in how technology evolution and architecture may have precipitated new phases or ended them.

No question, this examination must necessarily acknowledge both intended and unintended effects. Business reliance on IT is a double-edged sword and, as shown with space exploration, we get to know how to reach a place too soon-- but only later how to stay there, and sometimes almost too late.

Yet, respectful of the need for wariness, we can honestly look at each of the aforementioned phases and, with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight, see for each one the gigantic "DUH!" that shouldn't have had to be. Obsolecence, irrational speculation, anorexia, and opacity if not arrogance... all of them butt-kicking poisons from the business side, not the IT side.

Because of that, where the topic is "intention", there is another big story, too, about the glacial maturation of what must be considered "business intelligence" (BI). Although at the moment mired in the learning curves of collaboration and analytics, BI's ultimate goal of achieving a sufficiently comprehensive perspective is perhaps represented most clearly by models such as Kaplan and Norton's Balanced Scorecard and European systems for systematically including the measurement of intangible assets, such as Karl-Erik Sveiby's Monitor and Juergen Daum's. At any rate, the rush is on for businesses to actually get smarter through intelligence -- with the twist being in the emphasis on having the right kind of smarts.

So, lessons learned: while IT makes action almost too possible and makes info almost too widely available, these are relatively intrinsic qualities of IT -- characteristics that have the great potential to simply erupt without regard to management, and therefore are not reliable barometers of business value in IT. In turn, that means we can't build value management on the basis of those characteristics.

The real issue for management is not to "enable IT" to do those things but instead to harness and leverage IT's innate ability to be an enabler itself. Business management is the source of return on IT investment.

In that light, some interesting points surface:

- The characteristic dimension of the business focus on IT management is, except for professional developers, not technology development!

- Neither, despite all the rage and benefit, is "business-IT alignment" the essence of IT management's focus on the business; that is really a business management issue.

- However, abstracting and separating the business and the information technology, the common challenge of managing IT is that IT's impact on business activity is so intense. In IT's role as a business "enabler", the critical success factor is the degree to which IT impact organizes the business rather than dis-organizing it.

Business management must step through the logic of that success. The logic has at least these three pillars:

(1) From the business perspective, for IT to be nutritious and non-toxic, the basic business need is to deal with what it is about the business that IT aligns and how IT does that.

(2) The responsibility for managing IT's role belongs to the business, not to IT. Responsibility for appropriate production within the role belongs to the IT management organization.

(3) What business needs IT to do in the business, just as business needs other functional elements to do, is to align economy and profitability, so that having one of them doesn't diminish the other. The way IT does that is to optimize capacity.

I.

The way business uses IT for optimizing capacity is by modeling business management of IT's impact through processes and portfolios.

IT inherently offers the kind of speed and scale with which a business must build and sustain capacity in today's marketplace. With capacity as a mandatory "given":
- Processes are responsible for economy versus capacity; and,
- Portfolios are responsible for profitability versus capacity.

Managing the contribution that IT makes through processes and portfolios allows IT to align economy and profitability through the organizing of capacity.

The huge top-level significance of that observation is in its implications for strategy and change management. Strategy presumes to model the competitive advantage that the firm can capture from perceived opportunity, while change management presumes to stabilize organizational resiliency and thereby keep the business positioned for opportunity. But in the effort to balance risk versus value, strategy reflects demand, and change management reflects supply, while neither must actually include financial optimization to be logically valid. The fact is that they both are simply designs that are fully able to get "their" jobs done while being benignly neglectful of financial stress. The organization actually has to figure out whether it can use these designs, but if it can't use them it doesn't mean they are broken; rather, just inappropriate.

Thus, with IT being such a dramatic enabler of both strategy and change, managing IT should in particular target helping to fit the strategy or change to the organization's terms of self-sustainability. In this regard, Process helps ensure that capacity is effectively useful, Portfolios help ensure that capacity is effectively directed, and IT supports both of them to get it all done.

II.

One analogy for this is that capacity is the "stored energy" or "battery" of the business. IT is what charges the battery. Consumption of that power is where processes do their work (economy), but the application of the power is where portfolios do their work (profitability).

By another analogy, processes make capacity into skills, and portfolios make capacity into value commitments. Furthermore, between those two, management creates behaviors, from which actual outcomes derive. Since the behaviors can either propagate or negate the potential of the skills to address the commitments, the benefits of skills (economy) may or may not apply to the opportunity represented by the commitments (profitability). Business management, through generating behaviors, makes the link, using decisions to deliberately leverage the skills for the commitments. IT supports that management, by literally incorporating the decisions -- that is, by making them "actionable" (functional) and thus producing behaviors.


In short, IT must produce resources; managers must deploy them, and the business must commit them. This perspective guides the assessment of IT's relation to both performance and return on investment. IT-generated capacity can give managers of business behaviors more options, but the value of the capacity is not created by IT -- rather, by the business modeling of both the consumption and commitment of the capacity. High performance presumes successful execution of good models, but meantime the models must be relevant to the strategy. Finally, strategy must be sensitive to the possible capacity that IT can generate, without arbitrarily "assigning" value to the possibility.

III.

In what follows over the next several iterations of this document or in other followups, we can illustrate that concept in more ways, as well as more specifically. For example, business process management (BPM), business intelligence systems such as configuration management databases (CMDBs), and performance knowledge systems like operational performance management (OPM) bring implementations of information technologies to more directly bear on the model-oriented management that optimizes capacity.

But the immediate general statement to be made is that the business needs appropriate capacity to address its desired opportunity; and it uses IT to provide itself with not just capacity in general but specifically with appropriate capacity.

Understanding business from an IT perspective is of vital importance to IT providers who must come up with useful resources. In that regard, superior architects power superior IT providers.

But more important is the flip side: understanding IT from the business perspective means understanding what business management decides to do with IT. IT management must take its direction from business management. The directions it takes are mapped out in processes and portfolios.


Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 7:52 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 10, 2006

What's So Hard About Software?

"I know that half of my marketing budget is a total waste. I just don't know which half!" That little twist on some wisdom attributed to retailer John Wanamaker pretty well sums up what most organizations know about their software assets. They just don't have the kind of information they can rely on to get past that point.

To the very same point, readers of InfoWorld in February got cover-story confirmation of what they probably knew all along -- the madness in their enterprise data is methodical, and it's time to see the shrink.

The key points of the diagnosis are especially familiar to organizations struggling with managing IT assets. Gartner maintains that on the maturity ladder of asset management, level three (of five) is where most organizations need to be, but most organizations get stuck on level two. Now, it's fair to say that most managers, checking themselves out, consider themselves to be effective if the future provoked by their decisions is simply better than the past they decided to change. But what appears to happen too often in asset management is that things get different allright... just not better.

The issue is not the confidence to make decisions; they do get made all the time. But because management is so reliant on measurement, and measurement is reliant on description, the quality of identifying data is where most of the management effectiveness is made or broken. Without decent data, the decisions aren't worth very much.

In capturing data about IT assets, perhaps little else is as difficult as tracking software. Not only is software made, bought, borrowed, stolen, found and inherited, but it hides and changes, too. Even if we include only the occasions where any of that was really intentional, the results offer a dazzling array of subjects to track and difficulties in doing it. The final irony is that as software moves from its origins to its destination, it legitimately gets tracked in different ways for different reasons by different parties. (Who knows the real identity of the man with a thousand faces?)

As we hear pretty regularly now, the definition of "crazy" is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. Since frustration with information about software assets is often really high for everyone in the chain of supply and demand, it's evident that the things we've done about it before, and keep doing, aren't working. So are we crazy, or is it just that we don't have any alternatives?

I.

Descriptions of software assets vary because of the diverse reasons for handling the software. Each party responsible for the handling naturally tries to optimize their description of the software for the particular purpose behind their own responsibility. In essence, the descriptive difference that they cultivate is part of their effort to raise their performance.

The irony is that, in an important way, this "performance" increase turns out not to be effective. Yet the practice of describing an asset in multiple ways does not often change.

To back up that claim, how do we define effectiveness? The two biggest impacts that software has on the company are on expense (operating costs) and productivity. In the organization's locations or processes, there are thousands of points at which expense or productivity can be affected. Factoring in that diversity, software decisions must improve both expenses and productivity to be called effective. But the tendency is to think in terms of each separate decision having a tolerable effect. This often goes mostly into stressing features and lowering the price. But in the mid-to-long term, if production generates excessive risks, then the cost of handling risks negates the savings of lower expense; and if cost-reduction generates excessive restrictions on acquisition, then the inadequacy of the acquired software undermines the potential level of productivity. So instead of a double-win situation we get a double-loss, and a vicious cycle to boot.

This points out that many decisions about software are made with good intentions but simply (and profoundly) are made out of context.

II.

Software management, as opposed to software tracking, tries to determine what patterns of software demand and usage correspond most closely with actual improvement or deterioration of sustainable expense and productivity. To find those patterns, management must do an analysis of what is there. To do the analysis, the identification of what is there must be valid. Unfortunately, the evidence of what is there is often highly unreliable -- unpredictably incomplete, misleading, or competing -- until it has been vetted, cleaned, tested and certified.

If those last few words ring a bell, it's probably because they are so recognizable as the same procedure used to transform most raw material input into a resource. It unglamorously (but crucially!) steps us down from "information management" to "data processing", where we can get enough traction to know that from then on we'll actually go where we steer.

The key barriers to effective processing of asset data stretch across the usual three dimensions of people, process and technology. Luckily, people are becoming less of a problem as the need to put skilled analysts on the problem of integrating disparate data becomes increasingly well understood and supported as a role and as a job. Meanwhile, technology continuously improves in its ability to automatically detect and announce when something has been added, moved, changed or deleted -- and to accept and understand external rules for doing so. That means different systems can better communicate with each other and/or with a neutral third system.

So, people are getting better at revealing the scope and depth of the problem, and tools are getting better at manipulating elements of its solution. But the remaining frontier is process, through which activity becomes achievement.

The key to the successful processing of disparate asset data is to understand how it became disparate in the first place. This understanding is represented by a model of the software asset lifecycle. As software goes through different phases from creation to distribution, use and disposal, each phase cultivates and records certain kinds of descriptions by efforts of parties responsible for the software at that phase. Since a given phase may also feature multiple parties with differing responsibilities and stakes, each party may have its own way of referring to the software at each phase. To process the data adequately enough for delivering a highly confident inventory, the process must know how to hit the various parties at all the various phases.

Aside from the challenge of bringing such comprehensive knowledge to the task, the big barriers to getting the job done are its cost payback and performance urgency. One way for organizations to address these barriers is to consider the task itself as an investment. If the cost of the task can permanently improve the cost of software ownership, and if the increase in information reliability immediately minimizes or eliminates management mistakes across the asset lifecycle, then the return on investing in the task is definitely positive and likely pretty high.

What are the pains from management mistakes that exemplify the urgency?

Try corporate fines for software license violations; failed systems rollouts due to software incompatibilities; and the combined bills for unnecessary redundant purchases and overly complicated technical support.

Then add on top of that the big issues that provoke them -- such as SarbOx compliance, which is mandatory regardless of the underlying expense it will exacerbate in process redevelopment, project management and purchases of "up-to-snuff" functionality. If it's not SarbOx then maybe it's a departmental consolidation, a new market-segment launch, or retirement of legacy systems.

Whatever: urgency is probably not missing. But practical opportunity to respond is the point of contention.

To define the opportunity, it helps to pick a target and a scope of impact, and then plan an attack.

One somewhat obvious approach is to begin sorting out the purchasing data (where acquisition cost practices can definitely be analyzed) and the inventory data (where distribution practices can be analyzed) -- and reconciling them with each other. The question of whether you actually have what you're supposed to have is the signature focus of this approach. But the answer first obtainable may or may not be reliable. The real point is to discover whether there is any control of the asset's lifecycle, and to begin instituting enough control so that the company henceforth can determine whether its production will predictably leverage the purchase value of the software. This discovery will indicate points of operation that are potential points of failure underlying the demand from business units, regulations, and funding caps. Eliminating these points of failure lays the groundwork for true and positive ROI from the software.


Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 11:07 AM | Comments (0)

Pointing The First Finger, Having the Last Word

One of the more interesting opportunities to demystify organizational ineffectiveness rests on turning over a common assumption that Authority should delegate Responsibility.

In a revised view that brings operational discontinuities to the surface before they do their damage, organizations should consider having Responsibility delegate Authority.

Responsibility requires explicitly committing to performance levels that are critical to the welfare of an organization's clients and stakeholders. When the stakeholder view of performance is itself explicit to all members of the organization, authority can be a flexible tool dynamically distributed to where and when it is needed most.

Members of the organization should be encouraged to identify what they can do to contribute to the organization's successfully meeting the responsibility; thereafter, the operational issue is understanding when their actual opportunities to contribute should be solicited and/or approved -- in other words, authorized.

Distributing authority is the main purpose of Approvals. If approvals are designed correctly, they are based on a set of priorities based on rules and requirements that represent the stakeholders' best interest and guide the interpretation of real-time events versus. Formalizing the understanding of these interests is where Policy comes in.

Obviously this also brings up the issue of what stakeholder is being represented -- consequently it is easy to appreciate that there may be multiple policies representing multiple stakeholders. This is presumably good for the stakeholders, but it is also problematic. For example, customer-oriented policies may overlap supplier-oriented policies in some repects but conflict with them in others. Since there is a greater variety of customers than suppliers, the chance of this happening is not insignificant. Emphasizing this point: anyone who has been caught in an "unsolvable" customer support problem, where multiple support parties cannot agree on providing a successful response, already knows that the likelihood of conflict is very real. This means that policy reconciliation is important to be able to pursue, and it needs to be timely in order to be considered effective.

By example on a grander scale, the breakdown of cooperative recovery in disaster situations such as the Katrina Aftermath exemplifies the weakness inherent in the system of authority delegating responsibility. This article from the New Orleans Times Picayune spells out the typical complications. In the story, the presumed top-level responsibility is to manage levees to protect the city from future flooding. But the attempts to align parties to the responsibility are conflicting with the current distribution of authorities (which have not issued from the responsibility). This current setup finds the practice of "standing authorities" delegating responsibility, with the result that the levee protection appears to remain uncoordinated. Excerpt:
[Republican Representative M.J. Mert] Smiley, whose district includes Livingston Parish, told Boasso that local-level leaders had opposed being part of the [proposed consolidated] authority “because we will never benefit in any form from your bill.”

In essense, that party refuses to accept the high-level responsibility, leaving it dis-organized and, even worse, ripe for competitive blaming should future flooding occur.

But let's keep that in context. Policy-based granting of authority also presents the issue of who should be interpreting approval requests, and who should account for compliance to approval standards. Since the policies and rules already set the key terms for granting the approval, approvals per se do not stem from the interpreters. However, in actual practice, authority based on the approval mechanism is granted by virtue of the interpreters. Who are these interpreters? Administrators and executives.

Thus we can see that to avoid dis-organization, what an organization needs administrators and executives to do is to dedicate themselves primarily to promoting acceptance of the high-level responsibility that represents the stakeholder to the organization. From this predisposition, it is far more likely that the resources actually resident in the organization can be tapped at far more depth and variety than is usually done. Organizations that enjoy the idea of being "agile" and "adaptable" must understand whether their basic premise for granting authority internally is actually productive or counter-productive.

In achieving that understanding, another key consideration will need to be the ways that processes currently distribute authority in competition with policy interpretation. As a proxy for approvals, processes can eventually hide the assumptions behind the decisions that the process enforces. This is actually being revealed somewhat dramatically through a new generation of business process management tools (BPM) that excavate rules from the processes and leave the rules bared to direct re-examination. Because of that, organizational behavior can be freshly evluated for how it connects the assumptions behind the rules to the demands behind currently respected requirements. Then we can adjust the assumptions, the connections, or both. Thus we can see how BPM works as an aspect of managing performance. The big opportunity is to improve alignment of the processes to the same responsibility that spawns policy and its approvals. That way, processes are more likely to productively support policy -- a "no-brainer" improvement objective in the face of challenges such as regulations, competitive differentiation, environmental risk, and economic pressure.


Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 8:22 AM | Comments (0)

February 9, 2006

Optimizing Business Services

"The more things change, the more they stay the same."

With major transformations of computing foundations happening about every seven years, this phrase doesn't seem to apply to the alignment of business and IT. Some industry writers point out that in many business organizations, by the time the enterprise was sufficiently mobilized to do client-server computing, it was practically too late -- because the internet had already arrived as the new baseline platform. For those organizations, this meant that the difference in computing from old point A to new point B was even more drastic.

But did these organizations do the same old thing with the new technology? Likely not. Executive commitment to new technology is more likely the result of first becoming aware that the right things to do now are different from the earlier things, and can't be done properly with the earlier stuff.

On the other hand, how about the parties that want to do business with the organization? Did they want the same things as before? Over the timespan of the technology transformation, new products and services were envisioned and launched in the markets, in some cases creating new businesses. Some of those new businesses were possible because the new technology made it viable to be a producer or provider of the new product or service. But all of them were possible because a customer, partner or other sponsoring stakeholder made it worthwhile to spend what it takes to create the necessary quality of the product or service. There was always a limit, though, to the amount of spending that is tolerated -- pressured not so much by the level of demand for the product or service as instead by the need for the "investors" to preserve their other ongoing opportunity.

In this scenario, spending on IT has had the very large burden of efficiently and desirably linking the timing and level of production investment to the level of quality delivered on demand.

This investment-versus-quality perspective sounds and feels like "cost-vs.-benefit" but it is primarily sensitive to the idea that both the inputs (investment) and the outputs (quality) are defined as "acceptable" by parties external to the organization. As it turns out, that imposes an excellently sobering discipline on the management of the spending -- and naturally there is then a question of whether management can live up to the discipline.

As an intermediary force between investment and delivered quality, managing the organization of information technology in the enterprise structures the spending allocations around business terms like "effectiveness", "performance" and "compliance" -- major indicators that the use of the investment is reliably headed towards the goal of delivering sufficient quality. For the recipient of the product or service, quality is not an imbedded characteristic of the product or service; instead, it is actually a measure of the compatibility and impact of the product or service under conditions of use. Producers can always aim for "good enough" quality, but they have to be diligently attentive to when and how the user raises, lowers or otherwise changes the standard.

We are generally accustomed now to thinking of IT assets synonymously with "investments", since the assets proxy for the actual original investment inputs. But in that, the inherent problem is the difficulty of assuring that the asset will in fact support outcomes that get measured as positively effective, highly performing, and reasonably compliant regarding the objectives of the associated stakeholders.

Effectiveness

To ensure that the asset does provide appropriate support, it is managed for its availability, its functions and its interactions -- through requisitioning, engineering, deployment and support.

The results of those management approaches are inventories, systems and processes that are used as building blocks for services that the business will provide.

The most general challenge in this management comes from the variability of demand; different users need different things at different times and places, and to produce appropriate responses the organization has to navigate production options that let it stay within the boundaries set by requirements. Management's dual task is to accomplish whatever levels of requisitioning, engineering and deployment are needed to satisfy the customer, but to also satisfy more general operational requirements for net effectiveness, performance and compliance.

Performance

With these potentially competing requirements and constraints facing them, management may employ a wide range of tactics, mixing and matching them in various models of delivery and support. Thus, the objective, by definition, is to leverage complexity for value.

But this can mean that availability, functions and interactions are determined, contributed, or controlled by different parties at different times. The reliability of these parties' participation becomes a dominating risk factor that itself must be addressed through a variety of means including standards, monitoring and agreements -- all of which must be practical, sustainable and enforceable within the period of related demand -- then ultimately changeable when demand itself changes.

When the internet reached its first critical maturity level as a platform, most organizations were suddenly able to see how much the stakeholder's reliance on the business management of IT could drive the IT operational agenda. Enabling customers through the business's IT became a competitive mantra. But malfunctioning IT could disable the service needed by a customer relationship; and at the same time over-engineered IT could languish in underutilization because it was not stimulating, or not connected to, a priority demand.

The twin needs of management to minimize disruption and waste while producing value and opportunity make optimization the most important word in the management strategy. But an inherent problem in optimization is coordinating the management of multiple subjects; they require a common reference for value (from production) and for progress (from execution).

Optimization

Business services, described properly, offer the common reference. As a production, the purpose of a business service is to leverage the functionality of IT for the customer . In execution, the service addresses business requirements, with a predictably acceptable combination of cost and quality.

The full definition of a service always includes the requirements to which it is intentionally exposed. To optimize the service, managers must be able to logically associate the requirements analysis with the characteristics and attributes of the service.

Defining those associations and tracking events related to them generates a description that all managers can share, helping each manager to identify when activities in their respective domain are significant to the state of the service. Monitoring correlations of events across the domains can establish critical factors of success and risk for the service performance.

By definition, "Performance" refers to the level of achievement towards a target responsiveness under demand. For managers, this includes a key distinction that must be maintained. The distinction -- between business service performance and IT service performance -- is important to the understanding of how managing IT creates value in the business.

- The performance of the business service is largely a matter of targets that are defined by the customer's perspective on fulfillment of needs. The customer is a client of the business. Business delivery of tailored fulfillment is a major objective.

- Meanwhile, IT functionality that is organized for the business service is managed as an IT service to the business. IT service performance is based on targets that are defined in terms of the business's perspective on provision of enabling resources. The business is a client of IT. IT provision on demand is a major objective.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 5:18 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

BSM: Play to Stay

Sports analogies aggravate a lot of people, maybe even more than military analogies do. But why do they keep coming up anyway? Because at least in sports, the rules of the game make the court or field a laboratory demo of problems, at a scope and level of complexity that we can easily grasp.

It's easier to see the relationships between the elements:
- assets (such as players),
- configurations (such as formations),
- functions (such as manuevers and roles),
- processes (such as plays),
- outputs (such as positions and possessions), and
- outcomes (such as points).

It's easier to see discrete management decisions about each element. It's faster to observe whether the impact of the decision is short-term or long-term, slight or heavy. It's even easier to remember what worked and what didn't, or no less important what actual effect occurred as opposed to what expected effect occurred.

When a point in the game calls for a certain type of change or benefit -- that is, a certain need -- we look at how many of those elements probably need to be adjusted to respond organizationally with success. We feel like we can see them all at once.

I.

When we ask a losing team what happened, there are hundreds of specific things that they might cite. But in the big picture, every team knows before they go into the game that they will have to do three things.

(1) Not make mistakes
(2) Stay in the game
(3) Give themselves a specific chance to win.

Said differently, execution, priorities and opportunity are the three dimensions of winning. They are not hierarchical; but they are systemically interactive. If one changes, the others do too. The challenge: any one of them can change independently of the others, and when one changes, the degree of change by the others is not always predictable.

So, in the heat of the moment, when the team must mount a specific response to a specific need, the actual response carries the burden of all three dimensions. The team's "game manager" needs to understand the possible trade-offs involved in giving more weight to one thing than another. Execution, priorities and opportunity then look and feel like risk, strategy and advantage.

The "organization" of a business response is multi-dimensional and multi-layered in exactly the same way as is the team response in the game. Material and structural interdependencies are exercised in operational interactions -- and there is always a question of whether the networks of relationships are adequate against the real pressure of demand.

The adequacy of the interrelationships is a result of whether their components -- like links in a chain -- are all strong enough as a group to allow their collective effort to withstand the attempted intensity of response. What difference does a change to any one of the links, intentional or otherwise, make to the ability of the overall capability? Is it the same difference whether the response is a risk-response or a strategy-response, or a stretch for advantage?

II.

Business theory presumes that if the game keeps changing then the way to stay in it is to constantly regenerate advantages, because otherwise "the competition" will eliminate you. In effect, this suggests making intentional variety a big part of the game plan. But every business has some limit to its economy of scope that prevents it from basing its day-to-day health and competency on irregularity. This is because the business is, by definition, predicated on relationships with stakeholders. Managing the value and success of the relationship dictates that the organization have behavioral consistencies that require underlying operational continuities.

In the game of business, a business service is a managed and structural response to a requirement for supporting a need in a business relationship. (Why "structural"? In the same sense that services like the Army and Parcel Post are different from the Navy and Email: they shape organizational resources differently for action.) The purpose of the business in the stakeholder's world is to produce a particular outcome, and the business addresses that stakeholder with appropriate services to facilitate that outcome. The facilitation itself might be directed with emphasis on risk, on strategy or on advantage to the organization -- but regardless of which constraint it is under, its orientation is towards the outcome that the stakeholder needs.

The business service is itself operationally composed of interacting processes. The processes exploit some logical interaction of assets, configurations and functions -- often without knowing whether it has to generate that interaction from scratch or whether it is ready and available.

In the business game, when the stakeholder need presents demand, the business must "call the play" and execute it, relying on the presence, quality and coordination of the players in the formation to provide the real-time means for producing the required impact. It seem obvious when put that way, but that is precisely the point regarding business service management (BSM).

BSM brings classic "management" attention and intervention to the interdependencies that make logical, intentional production of appropriate responses reliable.

III.

Management always includes mechanisms for:
- visibility
- measurement
- analysis, and
- communication

which will be employed in tasks for:
- design
- development
- alerts
- control,
- evaluation, and
- change.

To put business responses under stronger management, the two major efforts in a BSM initiative are:
- to conceive and model business responses as services made of essential components and their relationships;
- to implement resources in a way that they are visible, sustainable and controllable as those essential components.

Complex? Yes. Controversial? No. Agreeing with the reason for BSM is no more difficult than is appreciating what kind of success a team would likely have if it couldn't keep the team organized on the field well enough to make the best use of its best players most of the time.

The play cannot be successful if:
- the maneuvers it hosts are not logically cooperative in how they influence the conditions on the field;
- the manuevers and their owners (the roles and functions) cannot cooperate effectively against the conditions without awareness of each other's dependencies and intent
- the formation (configuration) is not designed to position the manuevers for cooperation
- the players (assets) that incorporate the formation are not the right kind of players or are unreliably ready for the duty.

IV.

Since these ideas are nearly self-evident to any experienced manager of an important operation, why are businesses only now likely to find BSM as being a critical success factor?

First, the amount of work involved is quite substantial, given the investment already made in achieving repeatable accounting for business events along the lines established in earlier business eras. Attention has, for good reason, been elsewhere. Expertise for transforming to each facet of BSM has to coincide with available time and cost -- and the appropriate knowledge management was not until now "on top of" the ways to make BSM initiatives viably and meaningfully incremental, giving it a plausible entree.

But another answer is that companies are not only just now practicing "BSM"... What has fundamentally changed is the opportunity to practice it both cost-effectively and pragmatically, rather than mainly conceptually or experimentally in implementation guidelines or enlightened point-solutions. Technologies that support management tasks have dramatically emerged and/or matured, in ways that are compatible with service modeling. Prior to these developments, management teams knew that the interdependencies within stakeholder-facing business activities had critical influence, but there was relatively little that could be done about it in both a rapid and enterprise-wide fashion. But now, the proven managerial ability to broadly affect those things in real-time makes it virtually mandatory to do so, since having that ability eliminates the business case for accepting the risk, inefficiency and opportunity cost of not doing it.

A last, but not least, answer is that business paradigms have changed with the environment. Just as CRM was not in the regular vocabulary in pre-internet 1989 but dominated 2003, another re-oriented perspective on business dynamics is settling in, driven by more attention to managing performance than to managing costs. BSM promotes much greater alignment of the architecture and infrastructure for business processes. This improves resource cost-effectiveness, but more importantly it improves responsiveness, through which more advantage can be developed and sustained, producing better top-line outcomes at lower risk. Enterprise architects have argued this exact point for over twenty years; but the fire that has been lit in modern businesses is awareness of the gigantic liabilities of unmanaged change. For many businesses, processes actually put a leash on the danger cost posed to execution, only to reveal the danger change poses to investments. Through business services, the company makes responses rationally manageable for quality and cost levels. But the change that is imposed on the firm's current state by multiple stakeholders including governments, partners, customers and employees ratchets up the requirement for fast reconfigurability against error and obsolescence -- which means visibility and control of the service's many moving and interlocking parts.

Few teams would expect to win with a disorganized roster. Few businesses of any significant size or durability would rest their information operations on an unmanaged network. Likewise, where the kind of functional resilience and advantage that a business needs is dependent on capabilities that only come from savvy complexity, BSM must be instituted to stay on the playing field.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 11:35 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 8, 2006

The Business Creation of IT's Value

Converting IT assets into Business Infrastructure

In determining the business value of IT, the challenge is usually stated as identifying how business results are attributable to employing IT assets. As Gartner analysts refer to it, the topic is "the value created by IT within a company."

How IT creates business value. That sounds like a well-defined problem. But when doing the actual calculating, it quickly emerges that such phrasing must be expanded and clarified.

For example, it can mean "value caused by technological means." That sends us immediately to investigating the idea of "causes". But meanwhile, saying "value" might mean only some results (targeted) among many; or it might mean the net impact after subtracting undesirable results from desirable ones. Furthermore, value need not always refer to business "results" because business opportunity is as crucial to the overall scheme of things as are results. Finally, business value need not be only one of these varieties to the exclusion of the others -- and it is certainly interesting to notice the relationships that exist amongst the different types.

I.

One type, though, does seem to have a lead. Given the permanently accelerated pace of change, preserving opportunity sounds like an indisputable top priority. Strategic studies will quickly point at the fact that IT is now critically important to even an acceptable baseline visibility of what is currently happening, while also being similarly critical to the making of what comes next. That one-two punch establishes IT as profoundly important even if measured only through imagining trying to "see" or "do" without IT.

With that consideration, we have a view on at least two value scenarios that are beyond debate.

One is that IT allows work to be organized into standing processes where otherwise the complexity of the environment and the organization would probably not allow. Clearly, the benefits of having a process versus not having one pertain to both the health and the growth of the business -- by providing for both scale and scope as well as both resilience and consistency.

Another scenario is related to the first but not in the most obvious way. IT assets are asked to pay for themselves, and yes, the basic way for them to do that is to enable business activities that generate income or reduce costs. But the reason why they can do that is not so much a matter of the automation they intrinsically bring -- rather, it is about "organization" that occurs due to management. This time it is not the work that is being organized but instead the work's sustaining environment. Not process; rather, infrastructure.

II.

The environmental impact of IT is driven by the business management's transformation (whether poorly or well) of IT assets into business infrastructure.

In this transformation, resources are central. A resource is an asset that has a job. The essential transformative event is when the asset gets an assignment. Value generation is engendered in the assignment. Thereafter, the actual "production" of value is a problem of capturing it from the assignment.

But the idea of "value" still refuses to settle into a single simplicity. On the one hand there is financial value, and on the other there is functional value. The two types are in the same class when we see them both (i.e., financials and functions) as economic impacts -- but they do not necessarily coincide. For example, selling something, making something, and consuming something are quite different paths to benefits, and the timing and level of their respective benefits are not necessarily going to resemble each other at all.

In accordance with that, the business always has at least two ways to identify a given resource. As a financial item, it is registered in asset management data (where it is simply called an asset). But as a functional item, it is registered in configuration management data (where it is called a configuration item). To be clear, it is customary to ensure that the item is registered both ways, but as we just recognized above, the one way's reasons are different from the other's.

Still, thanks to widespread but casual notions of return on investment (ROI), configuration items might confusingly be typecast as "property", and subjected as such to direct financial impact assessments. This risks ignoring the effects of the item's current functional influences, but most organizations have already made adjustments to this by classifying and comparing costs and benefits associated with the "use" of the item. Usually, that move is calculated to reveal how expensive is the financial commitment to the item. In the typical classifications, assumptions about the item usage are set out as benchmarked experiences, generally classified as expectations regarding "acquisition" and "maintenance" (including storage), and "performance" and "support". The fiction built into this is the idea that there are many different ways to hit the same given benchmark, making it only necessary to pick which way has the best price. But the reality is that each available way changes the likelihood of hitting the benchmark, not just the price.

Still, the story of the "expensive experience" explains the habit of thinking about resources as "financial assets" ...The problem with that habit emerges when managing assets to those benchmarks is found to be not the same as enabling the business for its needs.

The more important perspective -- which avoids that problem -- is one that looks at the continuous organizing of items into a system of business support. Because business capabilities are increasingly predicated on the functional impacts of IT utilization, the business potential in that system is the "core" value of IT. By analogy, the U.S. superhighway network was hideously expensive to produce, but the economy (economic productivity) that it enabled is almost incalculably more powerful than the best that could be achieved before the system was delivered.

III.

Despite that idea, the notion of "IT Value" is often still confused by a failure to identify the point of view from which "value" is being defined. But if the reason for the discussion of value is to express how IT leads to important results from business functions, then the key issue is how effectively the business exploits IT as a resource.

To further clarify this subject, we would first distinguish the IT "department" from the information technology itself, and investigate how the business manages to leverage the information technology not just through deparmental overview but as an overall enterprise-wide discipline.

This discipline inherently crosses a variety of contributing business functions, a fact that is sometimes dealt with through process or lifecycle models that track the organization's attention to IT-related business goals.

But the primary virtue of those approaches is their description of how the business affects and rates the conformity of the IT resource to target specifications -- where specifications represent the business's theory (proven or not) of what functionally causes affordability and/or success. Said differently, they both provide a sophisticated technical explanation of resource links to business requirements.

The development, continuity and availability of IT resources for business enablement should also have visibility separately from those models -- as a system , the point of which is to continuously generate and regenerate an infrastructure for business.

In attending to the resources, this view is complementary to those other models but not redundant, because:
- infrastructure may be specified, but the practice of realizing the actual infrastructure is always executing (and virtually competing) against complexity, uncertainty and change.
- Then, the business reacts primarily to the reality of that execution's impacts, not to the implications of its measured level of compliance to specs.

Managers have the responsibility of helping the business get necessary business performance from the realities, regardless of the quality of the infrastructure. The infrastructure may have a certain distinctiveness (as measured by its current compliance to specs), but "value" is by definition a distinction with a difference. If the distinctive infrastructure is not making a difference to the business, then it is not generating business value.

IV.

As a result, the value of managing the IT -- that is, of managing the IT realization of a business infrastructure -- cannot be understood only in terms of the scores for reaching various intended states of quality. Just as in a car, instrument dashboards are necessary, but even though they may be highly accurate, they don't tell you whether you are winning the race.

Instead, the value of the management (i.e., delivering a business infrastructure from IT) must be detected in terms of its being a competency that has a certain impact while seeking maturity.

That said, the relationship between impact and maturity should not be taken for granted. For example, immature innovations can have gigantic impact, while very mature abilities may provide no significantly greater impact when just replacing other mature abilities. Impact correlates with the circumstances in which the maturity of the ability is applied. Where our concern is with "business value", the circumstances in question are the business needs.

V.

In its economic and competitive environment, the business's ability to respond as needed is always its top concern. So, the fundamental question that must be asked is always the same: what difference does the business want the infrastructure to make?

In making the answer come true, management's responsibility is to organize IT in a way that promotes the currently requested difference.

Competency in producing an appropriate infrastructure for business needs is the real target of the infrastructure management effort. Programs, services and operations must assure resource alignment with business needs. Architects, suppliers and business unit execs must coordinate the alignment opportunities. The following picture maps the coordination:

This goal emphasizes a type of focus on resources that must strategically assure their development, continuity and availability -- three dimensions of capacity, affected by many quarters of the organization..

The basis of that strategic perspective on resources is an understanding of how assets and configuration items -- two views on the same environment -- together describe capacity for business responsiveness.

The basics of the concept are as follows:
- the working environment is populated by items
- the items group costs into investments
- the investments support production
- the production converts demand into valid opportunity for reward.

However, none of those points occurs as described, except by willful action of the organization. Each point involves a commitment to handling the items involved at that point. Each commitment is based on a financial aspect and a functional aspect of the items. The chain of commitments creates capacity from the items.

Protection against the risk of diminished or insufficient capacity versus demand is one of the dominant points of view that the business brings to identifying return on investment. This means that to understand where value in IT comes from, it is mandatory to understand where demand is coming from.

Demand, by definition, arises when needs are prioritized into requests for action. But need itself comes not only from business ambitions; external forces on the business challenge the ambition that the business has of itself and its future. To accomodate and solve those challenges, the business response must apply diverse but coordinated management perspectives to the way that its capacity can be translated into appropriate action.

Said differently, the business does not spend time questioning whether it should use IT. But it spends time questioning how to use IT well. In seeing IT as a business resource, solving the problem of responsiveness means addressing :
- where the resource comes from,
- how employing it is supported, and
- what mechanisms can ensure that it is in the right place and hands at the right times.

This is where the business view of IT resource must be translated from a user-orientation into a provider orientation. The user-experience of the resource, as provided through the processes, systems and portfolio of holdings, is interpreted into management action items that generate or regenerate the infrastructure. A representative general illustration of that translation (click here and maximize) shows the highly familiar components of IT management, oriented to the way business recognizes its opportunity to leverage IT capacity.

This translation is one major facet of IT alignment to the business, underpinning the business value of the IT. More consideration of that alignment, as seen also in the first diagram above (or click here), helps to appreciate how the overall adoption and effectiveness of IT as a business resource is comprised of:
- strategic resource development: managing sources through IT programs;
- transactional resource continuity: managing events through IT services; and,
- operational resource availability: managing states through IT operations.

VI.

But what makes this all "systemic" ?

The general principle is that if you remove one part of the complex, the rest will "fail". Experience tells us that the segmentation of responsibilities and authorities can create sub-organizations or functions that are protected against the disappearance or failure of other parts. However, we now recognize that same insulation as the origin of "silos" that prevent the difference necessary for the business from being drawn from the distinction that the silo maintains.

Regarding infrastructure, what forces this issue of interdependencies into prominence is the degree of change that characterizes day-to-day business. Change means that there is no perfect static infrastructure, rather only one that is "good enough" to succeed on demand before it must be modified into an equally successful new one for subsequent demand. Constant reformulation of the infrastructure introduces tremendous pressure on its real-time reliability for business.

Because of the range of demand that the business wants to accommodate, the options and opportunity costs associated with composing support for business responsiveness are in much greater volume and variability. This increases the likelihood that modifying one aspect of the resource management will have a significant affect (even if latent) on whether other aspects will be effective for meeting other demands. By analogy, that wrong-sized spare tire up front that gets the car back on the road also takes away the ability of the braking and steering to automatically synchronize; the turbocharger of the engine takes away the chance to use a regular grade fuel; and so forth.

Consequently, as demand management and change management become more and more critical to the ordinary reliability of the infrastructure, the notion of successful infrastructure must refer to something increasingly more dynamic, and the concept of IT's business value must embrace the opportunity created and preserved by agility as the first key value measure.


Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 9:05 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 6, 2006

Surveying IT Governance

The concept of governance in business is not an overly complex concept, but its implementation can be dizzyingly elaborate. Surveying it very broadly, we find that it variously and passionately refers to accountability, alignment or control. However, these references are not competing with each other but instead reflect the richness of the problem that we can summarize at an even higher level: "management".

I.

Ever since Frederick Taylor, the science of good management has been characterised by a small number of factors all related to the same idea -- demonstrable effectiveness of resource, or what sometimes is just as well called resource optimization.

In order to optimally utilize resources, a few critical success factors of their management always pertain:
- definition of their conditions (clarity)
- measurability of their application (certainty)
- direction of their effort (relevance)

Over the years, there have been many ways to interpret and discuss each of these essential scientific qualities of the management effort -- arguably none more persistently than accountability, alignment and control. Typically, different particular roles in the organization's community -- such as sponsors, executives, operators or clients -- host and promote different interpretations, according to the responsibility within their respective roles. But this does not mean that they are separated or indifferent to each other. All interpretations can be inspired by some of the same key business issues -- such as whether resources are economical and why; whether outcomes are improvable and how; or whether advantage is sustainable and where.

Nonetheless, particular blends of roles and issues bring distinct sensitivities, or perspectives, to the observation of the resource impact on business performance. When it comes to handling IT as a business resource, the perspectives interpret topics like economy, improvement and advantage by assessing things to be managed -- for example, characteristics of the IT resource inventory like supply, configurations, and distribution; or characteristics of the IT resource deployments like capacity, processes, or access.

Having multiple perspectives is a good thing. Any one of them will usually catch something of importance that the others missed. For the sake of planning, these "catches" bring up interdependencies -- for example between supply and capacity -- that affect or exemplify the logic of expected benefits versus risks.

Revealing such logic is a breakthrough. The collective effect of these perspectives is that through their sustained diligence, they bring a regular visibility to the dynamics behind whether the resource impact is:
- good or bad (preferred),
- intentional or unintentional (prescribed), and
- correct or incorrect (allowed).

Formally interrelating their sustained diligence, Governance brings those three "dimensions" of impact to evaluate and coordinate the state of the business operation. The effectiveness of that is largely in revealing and reminding that each dimension can develop ad hoc and/or independently of the others, but that they need to be blended into a compatible set of conditions for supporting business goals. Decision-makers and designers of all kinds throughout the enterprise quickly engage the views, because in particular those two roles must assure that the business value of the resources emerges systematically in operations.

In other words, the effect of IT Governance is to institutionalize the business management of IT.

II.

Emphasizing a proactive stance, it is easy to appreciate that this effort at "managed assurance" is most often projected as "control". Maturing the assurance effort into repeatable and reliable success strategies, practitioners have collaborated for years on organizing and sharing their learnings by creating frameworks that:
- memorialize and increase awareness of significant assurance opportunities,
- guide selection and decision of priorities and methods, and
- establish terms and conventions for monitoring and analysis.

However, behind these frameworks for success, there are varying nuances to the idea of "control", ranging from influence to facilitation to command. Meanwhile, particular roles and circumstances generate a variety of individual business needs. Together, as opportunities and catalysts, these nuances and needs have combined in different ways to spawn different frameworks that all continue to be cultivated.

Over time, different frameworks can each grow out to a point where they overlap others; but if these frameworks are to provide reliable guidance, their overlaps need to be reconciled to ensure that the various frameworks do not work at cross-purposes, despite the intensity and complexity of how elaborate they may become.

Before worrying about that, perhaps there is an even more pressing problem in the organization: a seriously imbalanced mix of individual control efforts already actually implemented for the many aspects of IT activity that ought to be governed. Today, that imbalance may feature incompatible, inconsistent and/or variously unsustainable approaches - in which much of the organization is already invested financially, mechanically or politically. Aside from choosing and trusting a framework to make sense of that variety and envision "leveling it out", there is the substantial pragmatic challenge of herding the cats.

The current wisdom on attacking this problem is that governance should be instituted "top-down" in the organization. A key virtue of that approach is that it minimizes the chance that adopting governance will suffer a "two steps forward one step back" syndrome, because authority and accountability are more rigorously enforced.

But a key challenge in it is that governance itself must be done in the service of the type of progress that the overall business needs. DIfferent parts of the organization contribute to progress in different ways. And different organizations often need to make different kinds of progress.

This throws attention towards the idea that IT governance should not be one-size-fits-all. Put differently, IT governance should not be just a set of "controls that makes alignment for business accountable" -- rather, IT governance must be a competency that demonstrably solves the right business problems.

III.

One key to demystifying adoption of practical IT governance is to first see, in more generic terms, what it is that is being addressed.

We have the range of carefully labelled starting points including "control by" certain parties; "accountability to" certain parties; and, "alignment for" certain parties. But while these may indeed indicate the particular involvement of different roles, the first thing to consider is the commonality of their interests.

Much of the commonality can be expressed and contained through explicit policies and rules. These share the ability to consistently regulate decisions about real-time events -- and it is vitally important for multiple co-operating stakeholders to draw confidence from that. For most organizations, this issue of aligning all decision-making and production design to some standards is the major driver of adopting IT governance. It is a direct response to the need for reducing the "collateral damages" of the organization's complexity -- such as operational costs, errors and liabilities. In effect, standards or regulations represent the party for which the resource utilization is aligned. In the abstract, this party might just be be the "desired future version" of the current organization. In the concrete, it might be a customer, sponsor or other (like the government) stakeholder who has enough immediate influence on opportunities or constraints to be able to dicate the terms of operation. Here, for example, we see Sarbanes Oxley, ISO9000, CoBIT and other directives in force.

Likewise, consistency results from adopting widely-proved guidelines for essential management practices. While "best practices" are propagated because they correlate with successful outcomes, the true value of adopting them is that they include the highest degree of validated measurability -- which translates into predictable improvements in manageability. As such, they need not replace already-successful measurement-based management -- but for managers under excessive pressure from complexity, they accelerate the implementation of low-risk comprehensive measurement. Here, for example, we see ITIL, CMMI, and other instruments featured prominently.

But despite the meaningful differences between those distinct example directives above, they all have the same practical goal: managing the business's preferences, intentions and allowances regarding resource selection and deployment against demand.

This practical commonality doesn't make the challenges easier, but it reminds us that an organization's existing abilities and initiatives for those same management tasks should be pointed at the impending or mandated policies, standards or guidelines. Why? Not just as enterprise housekeeping but, recalling the primary management theme of effectiveness, so that business progress is more strongly enabled. Before that re-orientation is done, we don't know what else new is necessary.

IV.

With the more generic overview in place, it is easy to appreciate the scope of reasons and benefits usually described within the initiative for IT governance.

"IT governance is an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization's IT sustains and extends the organization's strategies and objectives." As seen on its website, the IT Governance Institute (ITGI, at www.itgi.org) continues that introduction to IT governance with a short checklist of things that governance must cover:
- ensure that "IT is strategically aligned with the business and delivers value, its performance is measured, its resources properly allocated and its risks mitigated."

The scope of coverage indicates that the business reliance on IT requires broad organizational accountability. This makes sense particularly in the sense that the business is a customer of IT. But the nature of the actual governance problem is better suggested by the idea that IT utilization is aligned for business. In this latter sense, business is a function, and as the format and value of the function changes over time, governance must deftly support realignment of IT utilization for enabling and supporting the function.

In other words, without diving down into the weeds, this functional outlook gets more directly to the matter of how governance accomplishes what it should accomplish.

As a high-level frame of reference for thinking about governance, the following idea makes a basic assumption about the business's "return on management" -- namely, that managment is given the day-to-day responsibility to take the organization from the current state to the "planned to be" state.

In order to do that, management must generally focus on achieving clarity, certainty and relevance of the resources it handles. But it must specifically focus on influencing resource impacts by wedding the clarity (definition) to the utilization. We tend to think of governance as being about "how things are done," but the closest examination of what we mean by that shows we are more considering "what things are done". The decisions about those things tend to focus on whether they are appropriate, and on what they require.

Consequently, the crucial work of coordination that governance can execute revolves around managing in terms of the "As Intended" Definitions of resource utilization. These are covered in three broad areas that hierarchically comprise the value chain for resource utilization.

Top-down, the business value hierarchy is:
Value: Objectives and Portfolios that align resources to needs
Fit: Architecture and Standards that align resources to requirements
Quality: Assets and Projects that align resources to purpose

As a result, we can see the parallel impacts cascaded (top-down) as well:
- Performance;
- Risk; and,
- Capacity.

Understanding governance from this high-level functional perspective has three major advantages.

1. It is less confusing as to where and why issues such as costs (financial controls), mechanics (processes and support), and politics (decision rights and organization structure) fit into the scheme of things.

2. It also becomes more obvious that the uniqueness of any organization -- which is readily detectable at the level of costs, mechanics and politics -- in no way divorces it from the general opportunity to govern IT effectively in accordance with general principles.

3. Finally, it is more apparent that the multiple roles in an organization can identify goals and opportunities to collaborate on improving existing governance capabilities incrementally, while not violating the interest of a top-down view of enterprise-wide consistency.

IV.

Governance practitioners and supporters take advantage of the last point above. Their challenge is to figure out where to plug into governance, and why. This shows up on both the "supply" side of the it industry and on the "demand" side.

For example, Microsoft focuses on operational excellence, yet to establish a business case for its solutions it talks about three things to consider: save more money (deployment), make more money (productivity) and keep more money (efficient support). These benefits, to be produced with Microsoft functionality, come with legal and financial restrictions on the availability of Microsoft technology, and corporate stakeholders (both internal and external) place further boundaries around how production is allowed to generate the benefits. Governance, through its frameworks and models, is instrumental to connecting the allowances for supply and capacity to the allowances for production and impact. Decision-makers and production designers must actualize the recommended connections.

On the demand side, distinguished practitioners such as CIO Emeritus Len Tenner of Hewitt Associates caught what might be the single most important observation about IT governance, as introduced by authors Peter Weill and Jeanne Ross in their book "IT Governance". Said Tenner in his recap: "effective firms must customize IT Governance to match their organizational approach and business goals."

But this just reminds us that the hands-on challenge of doing IT Governance is for the organization's leaders to define, produce, deliver and support governance itself -- an ongoing, multidisciplinary, cross-functional effort at developing and maturing a competency.

Certainly not the last definition of that competency, but a pretty exemplary one, is from deep inside an office in a department of a non-profit organization whose success is also increasingly reliant on effective IT:

"IT Governance - A structure of relationships and processes to direct and control the enterprise in order to achieve the enterprise’s goals by adding value while balancing risk versus return over IT and its processes." (Austin Community College Internal Audit Office)

The message in offering that citation is that the phenomenon of IT Governance is not about an industry, a business model, a market segment or a product, and not even primarily about technology. Instead, it is primarily about a management discipline focused on a business resource.

The involvement in IT Governance must be championed not by "business people versus IT people", nor by "executives versus producers", nor "auditors versus employees". Instead, it must be championed by managers at all levels of the organization.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 3:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 4, 2006

Change How You Change

The overall session plan for the strategic planning retreat was conventional. It began with a period of discovery and investigation, and would follow up with some prioritizations and then finally some commitment-making. But now it's running late. Then the attendees hit the realization that they don't yet agree on how to agree...

This moment is likely to recur; we can expect it at least once during discovery/investigation; again during prioritizations; and yet again during the committing phase.

The way the sessions are currently formatted is supposed to get them past these points, but now that's being seriously tested. The particular instruments being used along the way -- collaborations, pop quizes or games, spreadsheets, anecdotes, humor, testimonials and others -- are important accelerators and steering wheels, but are they even the level on which this barrier needs to be tackled?

We can detect the heat of the moment by someone saying "How about, let's try this..." and not infrequently the group willpower to make progress will find something that seems to cure the moment. But what if this is really skirting the issue -- which is that not knowing how to agree is a symptom of not knowing how to change?

I.

Real change hasn't occurred until the party that must sustain the change has become an agent of the change. For this to happen, that party's consciousness has to be altered. When the party is an entire group, the timing might be more difficult to anticipate, but the rule remains the same.

The change of group consciousness is a pattern we come to recognize -- occurring in four main stages that will ultimately allow a strategy to be adopted.

To see this clearly, the three-stage session format must first be set aside, although it might later be brought back more clearly as a vehicle instead of as a driver.

Even then, though the direction is towards making strategy adoption allowable, the destination must be correctly understood. There will still not yet be a strategy plan to adopt; but this is appropriate and, more to the point, necessary.

Why is that more to the point? Because making strategy is inherently a creative process and the bulk of the value is in the process of making, not in the product (aka the strategy plan) made.

Once the product exists, the value of the product is not a function of strategy -- rather it is a function of applying the strategy plan, which really is the issue of execution. Execution accounts for the mandate "change how you succeed". Because everyone wants to focus on success, it's natural that almost everything gets seen through the filter of execution.

But Strategy accounts for the mandate "change how you change." The most significant transformation that the organization has to go through is not the difference between new directives versus old ones, or between certain new processes versus old ones, but instead between being routinely strategic versus not being routinely strategic. The key challenge for most organizations now is to generally and continuously behave strategically, instead of simply executing approvingly.

II.

Here's how, in these sessions, we get to the real "strategic goal", which is actually not a way of being new but instead a new way of being.

First, we learn or otherwise acknowledge that needs are not requirements. Too often groups go into "strategy sessions" believing that the reason they are there is to find solutions instead of finding themselves. The solutions of course are connected to perceived problems, which in turn are connected to ideas about intolerable current differences from a state that "should be". (Observe how much churning is associated just with the disparities in those perceptions...) This issue of what "should" be is most often set forth as a future state which is described as goals. Those goals are normally "felt" like requirements to meet. So what's wrong with this? Answer: the feeling is almost invariably interpreted through familiarity with the way things have already been done. That feeling is about what, and how much, of the familiar stuff has to change. Granted, it is sensible to think about "how do we get there from here" -- but this is not going to establish the reason or justification for adopting an emerging strategy. Actually, it's a source of wrangling over commitments to the past.

The one thing that must be clear before the next step in consciousness can emerge is instead a common awareness of what need must be met. Meeting the need will happen in the future, but the importance of the need is that it already exists. Yet the need will not be properly acknowledged until the stakeholders have been identified and ranked by their importance as target beneficiaries. Keeping in mind that we ourselves are stakeholders, too, our responsibility to the stakeholder(s) defines the need that must be addressed. We have to both acknowledge the primary stakeholder's mandate, and agree to cooperate with it. To round out the understanding of need, we also have to be able to relate our own interests as a stakeholder to the highest priority other stakeholder. It is necessary to ask, "What is our purpose", but it is insufficient; we must also ask "Why is that purpose ours?"

In the next step, that clarity of need sets the perspective that sorts out the discoveries from current-state investigations so that effective selection and organization of knowledgable inputs can occur. What should come here is visibility that allows us to identify the right problem to solve. This step is often deceptive because of the difficulty of defining problems in the way they need to be defined. In this phase, a "problem" is a necessary difference to be made, for which the significance is stated and agreed but the approach and means is not. In other words, the problem is the "value proposition". The working definition of value is "a distinction with a difference" -- and the essential task of this step is to decide what difference is necessary to satisfy the already affirmed need. In this stage, understanding difference involves recognizing that alternatives exist -- as opposed to just modifications. A modification means that the stakeholder can make something useful in a different (and presumably better) way, but an alternative means that they are free to simply use something else entirely. To eventually be responsible for an alternative, the providing party will take efforts that must be understood now yet need not be chosen until later, as in the next phase.

Consequently, some parties, at this point, understand for only the first time their true current position .

In the third step, the challenge is to choose your pain. This is a double-barrelled shot, because it calls for acknowledging that any choice has both positives and negatives, and because a choice must actually be made. Where do parties go wrong here? Their energy is highly charged and in large supply for trying to negotiate a consensus on which benefits and which risks should be accepted -- as if they were separated from each other in different aisles in the grocery store and only wind up in the same shopping basket by our discretion. But these invented match-ups will often be just fictions waiting to fail. Instead, some from of rigor must be applied to measuring opportunity costs, so that it is clearly understood that all value comes with risks, and that one cannot choose a value without choosing its already "built-in" risk as well.

When the logical associations of value and risk are frankly admitted across the board, the final step in the change of consciousness can develop in a way that can rationally affect agreed action. In this step, value and risk are both seen as aspects of opportunity, and the ability of the organization to leverage the risk of value becomes a foreground subject -- one that will point at logical material relationships of the expectations, structure and command of the organization. In effect, by emphasizing recreation instead of modification, this stage will change how we change.

Changing how we change does not necessarily produce a different outcome -- instead, the point of it is to be able to produce the needed outcomes in a different way. Developing a strategy is creating a way of being; and changing a strategy is changing a way of being. Being strategic is a competency, not an event.

III.

A design equation for the strategy forms: "why we should take this value" plus "how we should take this risk". Solving the equation will create the common vision of the way the organization should be. That provides the rationale for how strategy adoption on the personal level will link to and complement its adoption on the workgroup, departmental, division and finally enterprise level.

Many organizations will be able to approximately navigate the sequence of four phases by identifying and aligning such issues as:
- the purpose
- the value proposition related to the purpose
- the benefits and opportunity cost of realizing the value proposition
- the allowable and sustainable organizational structure given the above

In real life, all current states offer alternative futures but no guarantees. The part that we can control is the way that we will be. In picking a future, an alternative is proposed but until it is adopted it is just an idea. Adoption means that we have become an agent of the thing we adopted.

Here is a recipe for mistakes and posibly rejection:

- starting out with "requirements": requirements don't make sense until after priorities have been determined about committing to the value proposition. Essentially, requirements point at "allowable means". On the one hand, that makes them a huge source of debate, since different stakeholders have both different means and different allowances. On the other hand, starting from "allowable means" focuses attention away from purpose and onto opportunity. Justifying the opportunity is business planning, not strategy planning.

- mistaking "control" for value: control is a quality governor, which is an execution-driver, not a value-driver. Control means a proposed distinction may be sustainable; but it does not mean that the distinction is necessarily meaningful to the strategically primary stakeholder. Stakeholders see value as progress. Management should be dedicated to progress, and control is important only when it is an enabler of execution and thus of progress.

- not defining ROI in terms of the offered value to fulfill: doing this sends a message that the work and/or workers assigned to pursue objectives will not be evaluated based on impacts but instead on compliance. Consequently, it distances the worker's motivation from the strategic purpose.

Arriving at a strategic identity can get sidetracked at each of those three points, and an existing strategic identity can likewise be thrown off-track. In learning to change how we change, the learning is crucially dependent on visibility of the appropriate things, but no less so on the credibility of how they appear.

IV.

Visibility and credibility are two-thirds of the way that a changed consciousness can get to adoption. This is why the session format of discovery/investigation and prioritization is common.

The final element is constancy. Assuming a strategic identity becomes sensible because it shows signs of being sustainable for the period set out by the primary stakeholder's need. What naturally goes along with this is that successfully satisfying the need can change the stakeholder, so the strategy should expect to evolve as well. But for most parties, a pervasive plan of investment in the strategy must materialize and illustrate that the organization's impending coherence is predicated on the strategy. This will explicitly describe the reasons why participants can count on their involvement being supported consistently enough for them to realize the benefits that they need themselves.

V.

The biggest question in strategic transformation can easily be whether changes in consciousness allow visibility, credibility and constancy to be efficiently and effectively received and used by key participants. Said differently, while much data and information is evidently critical to the ability to formulate and describe the strategy, the more important issue is the perspectives in which such data or information are found and used. In order to get participants to agree on how to agree, they must have a shared perspective that is consistently appropriate to the subject of taking responsibility for realizing the primary purpose. The four stages in changing consciousness creates that perspective.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 7:03 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 3, 2006

Decide, Design, Deploy -- Then Assess

More than any other role in the enterprise, managers are the focal point for accountability of execution results. On the one hand, this means that the organization's overall visibility of its progress is created by managers. On the other hand, it means that poor visibility is attributable to the way managers view things. It therefore becomes crucial for management and the organization's other stakeholders to have a given view that they both understand the same way.

Evaluations and assessments strive to create that shared view. But while most organizations mandate evaluations, many use them without any strategic impact on the direction of change or the continuity of improvement. Confusion is easy when the effort is to describe comprehensive responsibility for consequences. Managers sit at the center of this disappointment, but they need not. The solution is to be sure that all parties know beforehand what it is that the evaluation can really explain. For managers, evaluations should explain not just a nebulous idea of "results", but a specific idea -- progress. And for all parties, it is necessary to understand that evaluations and assesments are not the same; without this understanding it is far more likely that one or both of them will be ineffective or mis-used. Too much effort will be spent boiling an ocean or too much spent looking in the wrong place for answers.

I.

Three kinds of issues dominate visibility of progress.

One: "performance" must have the same definition for everyone. The generic definition would be "the degree of achievement towards a set goal, as generated by execution under demand." This is the context within which "progress" makes sense. The equation must be that the results of execution must amount to achievement, not just difference.

Two: a consistent understanding must be established of what is meant by "results". Here, the relationship between execution goals and impact goals is the subject. That is, since execution adds, moves, and/or changes things, one result is about whether those differences work out just as prescribed; but another result is that the influence they have works out as is needed. Progress is really the direct measure of whether the prescribed differences were obtained. The equation is that change equals requirements.

Three: the ability must be developed and used to accurately identify both what is "necessary" and what is "sufficient" -- and distinguish them! This subject is often complicated by confusion over where it is in the realm of execution that "needs" ought to hold top sway. This is not so much a debate about whether satisfying needs should be the driving purpose, but instead about who gets to declare the needs to which all production should align.

For those three interlocking reasons, the idea of evaluating performance is inherently a complex one. All organizations do a number of things that they call "performance evaluation" -- but the huge variety in how one outfit does them versus another is exactly why there is an industry for "best-practice" advice on the matter instead of only for precision techniques.

II.

Given the above, any organization could likely find significant differences in its view of achievement, progress and production -- once it knew to look for differences. This is one practice-level aspect of evaluations.

That said, two different organizations using the same practices should be able to understand things the same way, albeit this makes sense only to the extent that they both ought to -- and a given practice still allows wide differences in technique. So why bother with evaluating things on the practice level?

Answer: a "practice" is not mainly about "the right way to do something". Instead, it is really about associating ways of doing things with value. In this case, the point is to get value from the evaluation effort, instead of just going through the motions of supervisory responsibility.

Typically, organizations have a lot more familiarity and experience with the technical aspects of evaluation -- while not necessarily knowing where their technique fits into general best practice. This might signal a situation where there is ambiguity about whether the evaluation is actually solving the right problem (or any problem at all.) What issue is the examination really expected to resolve, and why?

An important starting point in clearing that up is to apply not only the above distinctions about "results" but also -- and even more importantly -- the following ones that reflect the difference between the beneficiary's stakes and the provider's stakes.

III.

What do organizations want "good performance" to mean? Essentially, it should mean that the organization's target stakeholder agrees that the organization's activity has created value for the stakeholder. The stakeholder's sense of received value can be quite varied -- ranging from relief to opportunity, and from intangibles to tangibles. From the provider's viewpoint, this extrinsic value is a goal of the provider's intrinsic performance.

Unfortunately, it is very common for external measures of an organization to be called "performance measures" -- but most often what is really being measured there is the extrinsic value of the organization's effort. Properly recognized intrinsic performance, which is an internal goal of the organization, is essentially a characteristic that the organization wants to acquire.

To be specific, the desired characteristic is the ability to produce an extrinsically valuable achievement. To get that characteristic, the organization has to get internal progress from its execution.

That gets us back to the issue of accountability and progress. The general question that performance evaluations try to answer is, "Did the way we do things get us the results we wanted?" If the answer is yes, management should be able to take the credit. But if the answer is no, then management could likewise take the blame.

In the credit and blame game, it's easy to react to a broad range of direct and indirect consequences, and lose focus on what should be specifically discussed about management -- namely, progress. Evaluations that seek to show comprehensive "responsibility for consequences" are too often boiling an ocean or looking too much in the wrong places for answers. Avoiding those problems is easier when we stay focused on accountability for progress.

IV.

How do we describe "the way we do things" and begin to account for progress? Most management activity can account for eventual progress in the way the management activity affected things at three different phases:
- decisions;
- designs; and,
- deployment.

In "making" progress, management has a short list of essentials to worry about -- all fitting under the umbrella concern of "can we do well what we are required to do?" Requirements generally come from:
- the dynamics of prevailing circumstances that are creating opportunity or risk,
- from formal restraints or orders, and
- from literal limitations of resources.

Correspondingly, the essential elements of execution that are to be managed are:
- Awareness (appropriateness of choice of response)
- Competency (effectiveness of response versus demand)
- Discipline (behavior or application consistency versus rules)
- Capability (the inherent functionality of a resource)

Managers "make" progress by cultivating and coordinating those elements -- through decisions, designs and deployments -- in ways that are specifically compatible with the terms on which activity is approved, by the organization, for responding to designated circumstances. As a final concern of management, the approval of the actual activity may come before the action or afterwards. While the terms of approval may be constant, the action may be prescribed beforehand, or justified afterwards -- reflecting the existence of some range for management discretion. Use of that discretion may become a particular point of evaluation -- one that questions the skill of the manager or the logic of the terms of approval, or both.

Taking progress as the subject, an evaluation is not really a "performance" evaluation except in terms of the performance of the manager who is responsible because of his or her presumed capability to manage.

Instead, regarding the measured execution results, the evaluation is a progress evaluation and what that evaluation is trying to explain is how the actual execution relates to the actual differences made towards meeting requirements.

V.

One of the profound realizations from that clarification is that execution always points in the direction of requirements. Wherever the requirements go, execution is responsible for meeting them. In real life, this means that the "fallout" of proper execution can easily feature enormous amounts of change, cost and discontinuity, because it was unavoidable as a consequence of the requirements. Therefore, if an evaluation of execution seeks to judge it by how much it was able to rein in change, cost, and discontinuity, then the evaluation itself is not measuring progress -- thus it is not measuring the intrinsic worth (the logical benefit) of execution. In such a case it is easy to see that execution might get modified as a reaction to factors that have not actually been linked to enabling the execution to better contribute to intrinsic performance. Anyone preparing or reviewing a business case will wrestle with this threat.

Clearly, however, factors such as change, cost and discontinuity are necessary to factor into the big picture -- the one shared by multiple stakeholders. After all, if execution is not sustainable, or if the side-effects of progress are corrosive to the organization's stability, then fundamental rethinking should be taking place. The difference between an evaluation and an assessment lies exactly here -- an assessment explains how the subject's results relate to the larger sphere of enterprise influence.

An evaluation can explain whether a job was really well done. But an assessment can explain what an evaluation cannot: namely, whether the job was the best "right" thing to do.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 5:35 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

February 1, 2006

The Enterprise Logic of IT Investment

Managing the enterprise features such a high degree of complexity because by its nature the enterprise tries to grow amidst enormous possibilities of internal and external change.

The internal health of the organization, and the external growth of the business, both rely on great systemic coordination.

The overall view of the related dynamics is often shifting or obscure, and in learning to cope with the variations the enterprise focuses on how to adjust to the moment in ways that aim to sense future conditions and engineer future events.

The combination of increased awareness and increased ability protects its prospects for continued health and growth.

Visibility and controls are strong proactive correspondents to the desired awareness and ability. The enterprise's proactive stance on protecting its future opportunity is reflected in its vocabulary and institutions. It propagates its stance mainly through communications and procedures, and it formalizes those means in the way it promotes and tolerates management. But then it defends that formalization, and implements it, by deploying IT.

The high-level description of that enterprise management is fundamentally the same for most enterprises. In the following picture, the essential storyline of enterprise action is shown as a matrix of management topics that describe how the enterprise systemically associates its action with its expected challenges and desired outcomes.

Notes:
All of the terms in the illustration can be prefaced with the word "business". This is because the purpose of the idea or concern that each term represents is to support the business. As an example of how this applies, however: if "requirements" in the IT arena are under consideration, this illustration is about what the business needs to get from those requirements being handled in IT.

1. The semantic separation of Performance, Execution and Operation is crucial to understanding how the organization and its stakeholders recognize opportunities to affect the future. The table shows that each perspective has its own type of goal. Understanding the differences between the types of goals is superficially easy, since they tend to come from different sources. Only for example: standards may come from experts; requirements may come from partners or customers; and targets may come from executives or investors. If a change occurs to one of these goals, the point is to realize where it will have impact. Change to Standards will affect production. Change to Requirements will affect execution. Etc.

2. The Benefits column shows what the activity is intended to be all about. Additionally, it shows the critical linkage provided by process management and portfolio management. These two disciplines create the channel that converts operational investments into managed impact on business performance. (Shown in the Benefits column, the two disciplines are placeholders for the artifacts that they also represent; the enterprise typically wants to achieve and improve processes and portfolios as negotiable products or holdings, not just use them as conceptual models or tools.)

3. The difference between Production, Progress and Achievement is as follows: production is the shape of the activity; progress is the output of the activity; and achievement is the significance of the output in the context of what the organization is trying to deliver to its stakeholders. All three of these are factors that may be individually found "positive" or "negative" compared to expectations or plans. But that status may or may not directly correlate with the actual effect that the factor has on the economic prospects and risk prospects. The "systemic" nature of the enterprise is that success on one level increases the likelihood of sustainable success on the level above it. Negative factors decrease the stability of the enterprise, making it less able to proactively maintain suitable levels of desirable influence on future conditions.

4. Economic Prospects can be understood both literally and figuratively. To make this point clear, first assume for the sake of argument that all activity is about dollars. In this case, economy is about dollar consumption; capacity is about how powerful the available supply of dollars is versus spending needs; and profitability is about how many more dollars of better-than-previous-power have joined the supply. But in a second case, assume that all activity is about a different asset, such as "knowledge". In this case, economy would refer to the percent of the retained knowledge that has frequently high practicality; capacity refers to how much of it has frequently high relevance; and profitability would refer to how much more of the knowledge is usable by how many more users, compared to a previous time or population.

5. Risk Prospects identify the primary source of challenge to what the activity is trying to control. There are two kinds of comparisons to see here. One kind compares the Risk to the Measures, illustrating that the momentum and probable success of the as-measured activity is very sensitive to the risk. The other kind compares the Risk to the Benefit. The variability of the risk factors can alter the level of benefit and/or alter the degree to which the level of benefit matters to the economic prospect.

Posted by Malcolm Ryder at 2:42 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack